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This essay will elaborate on the South Caucasian conflicts of Nagorno-Karabakh 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which happened from 1988-1994, and those between 
Georgia and its breakaway territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia from 1991-1993. 
The goal is to show how Cultural Affirmative Philosophy may transform no-war-nor-
peace situations into new possibilities for gradual conflict resolution. The thesis argues 
that the roots of the current ethnic and territorial antagonisms in the Caucasus are not in 
ancient hatreds, but are the results of war machines that were put into motion during the 
90s and continue to keep communities and decision-makers enslaved by transcendental 
dynamics. Despite all the existing obstacles, it is still possible to deactivate the war 
machines through the lines of flight between similarly nomadic actors online. New media 
activism, which is accurately described by the Deleuzo-Guattarian concept of the 
rhizome, can challenge barriers that divide postwar communities and create platforms for 




























EXAMINATION OF CAUCASIAN CONFLICTS THROUGH CULTURAL 
AFFIRMATIVE PHILOSOPHY………………………………………………………..4 
 
Overview of the Historical Background………………………………………...9 
Separation………………………………………………………………………16 
Violence in the Caucasus and Political Use of Human Bodies…………….......18 
Peace Processes in the Caucasus……………………………………………….24 
 
WAR MACHINES AND THE NEED FOR INTERRUPTION……………….............29 
Homogeneity of Traditional Media………………………………………….....34 
Soft Power Against Media Activism in the Caucasian Nation-States………….37 
      Development of ICTs and the "Power Shift" in the Caucasus……………...38 
      Adaptation of the Nation-States with the New “Power Shift”……………...45 
      “Liberation Technology” as an Ideological Battlefield…………………….51 
The Need for War Machines’ Interruption……………………………………..65 
      Where's the "War" in the Russia-Georgia “Cyber War”?..............................66 
      Application of Schmitt Analysis……………………………………………77 
      The 2008 Cyber Attacks on Georgia as a Sample Interruption……………..84 
 
DEACTIVATING WAR MACHINES THROUGH DELEUZO-GUATTARIAN 
RHIZOME OF NEW MEDIA…………………………………………….....................87 
 
Blogosphere and Social Networks………………………………………….......90 
Citizen Journalism……………………………………………………………....92 
Collaboration between War-divided TV, Radio, and Print Journalists………....94 
Transformative Mediation through Media Production………………………….95 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH……................98 
 
v	  
Research Question One: What Perspectives Does the Cultural Affirmative  
      Philosophy Open Up for the South Caucasian Conflicts?...............................99 
Research Questions Two and Three: What Are the Implications for Media  
Activists in the Process of Opening New Perspectives Through Their     
Activism? What are the Social and Political Implications of Rhizomatic Media 
Activism in the South Caucasus?...................................................................102 











This thesis examines Caucasian conflicts through the application of Cultural 
Affirmative Philosophy, which implies discussion in terms of abundances and 
multiplicities, rather than scarecities and negations of differences. The manuscript offers 
a close reading of Deleuze and Guattari’s Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze’s reflection of 
Nietzsche’s philosophy (1983) and Badiou’s ideas from Infinite Thought (2003). The 
essay aims to challenge existing perspectives on South Caucasian conflicts, examining 
how the application of a plateau of intensity to the Caucasian situation reveals multiple 
images of dynamism, desiring-productions, and states of endless becomings. The 
intention behind this utilization of Deleuzien, Guattarian, Neitzsheian, and Badiouian 
vocabulary is to bring to light factors of intercultural, interethnic, and international 
cooperation that are hidden in the shadows of yet-active war machines. War machines 
keep active forces reactive, but do not let them gain alternative views on the conflict 
resolutions.  The nomadic multiplicity of people that helped put the war machines into 
motion can speak up directly through the rhizome of creative media activism and, thus, 
challenge the militarist aspirations of the society. The Deleuzo-Gauttarian concept of 
rhizome, indeed, is a perfect model for the World Wide Web, which would multiply the 
nomadic nature of citizen journalists’ activism and transform the conflicts towards 
reconciliation (Ramsbotham et al., 2005). Thus, the essay aims to answer the following 
research questions: 1. What possibilities does Cultural Affirmative Philosophy open up 
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for the South Caucasian conflicts? 2. What are the implications for media activists in the 
process of opening new perspectives through their activism? 3. What are the social 
possibilities and the political implications of rhizomatic media activism in the South 
Caucasus? 
In order to better accomplish this goal, the paper is divided into four chapters. In 
the first chapter, the ideas of Cultural Affirmative Philosophy and their influence on my 
analysis of the South Caucasian conflicts will be overviewed. Then, the coming sections 
of the chapter will provide historical background, starting from traceable ancient roots of 
the South Caucasian conflicts up to the most contemporary history of the peace process in 
the region.  In the second chapter, the paper will move on to a more detailed examination 
of Caucasian ontology through the application of the Deleuzo-Guattarian concept of war 
machines (1987), which represents a mix of various similarly unrelated actors and events 
that act in a tandem of destructiveness. Badiou’s reign of communication and 
merchandise, as well as Deleuze’s control societies and “vacuoles of noncommunication” 
(Deleuze, 1995, p. 175), and the need for interruption (Badiou, 2003) will be discussed in 
relation to the Caucasian war machines.   Homogeneity of traditional media in the 
Caucasus and the coercion of media activists via soft power will be brought up, and the 
2008 “cyber war” in Georgia will be re-territorialized as cyber attacks and hacktivism. 
However, to argue against a widely accepted fact that the August 2008 cyber attacks of 
Georgia constituted cyber war, the paper will employ the Schmitt model1 and bring 
credibility to an otherwise radical claim. The third chapter introduces the Deleuzo-
Guattarian rhizome, which is a nonhierarchical, borderless, persevering network of actors 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





that can be constructive even while dismantling war machines.  The paper   argues 
rhizome is a creative new media activism, which peacefully eludes control and interrupts 
war machines.  The sections of this chapter will discuss the potential role of the 
blogosphere and social networks, as well as citizen journalism and traditional journalism, 
in transformative mediation and deactivation of the war machines. The final chapter will 
discuss the implications for future research, including the utilization of Cultural 
Affirmative Philosophy in the South Caucasian media and scholarly praxis, the impact of 
media activism on the ground, and the affect on media activists themselves in the process 
of opening new perspectives through their activism.  
Hence, the essay will argue that Cultural Affirmative Philosophy and, in 
particular, the way of thinking in terms of multiplicities, unlocks enormous potential for 
paving the way of gradual conflict resolution in the region of the South Caucasus and will 


























EXAMINATION OF CAUCASIAN CONFLICTS THROUGH  




The central advantage of employing Cultural Affirmative Philosophy for searching 
for a way out of deadlocked conflicts is its ontological commitment, which does not 
guarantee success but at least offers action instead of reaction; affirmation instead of 
negation. This immanence approach is even called pluralism and empiricism (Deleuze, 
1983).  
Deleuze (1983) works by analyzing Nietzsche’s philosophy and says, “there is no 
event, no phenomenon, word or thought which does not have multiple sense” (p. 4). Truly, 
there is no event or notion that does not have multiple meanings in the Caucasus, but this is 
not why these conflicts exist.   The reason for having a deadlocked situation with growing 
potential for war renewal is the negation of the idea of multiplicity, and conforming to living 
in scarcity. Such living in singularities does not have room for understanding anything 
contrary to one’s own.    
 Deleuze (1983) says, “a thing has as many senses as there are forces capable of taking 
possession of it” (p. 4). “Forces” are something Caucasians claim to have fought against 
throughout centuries to survive numerous conquerors, and those forces continue coming from 
East and West.   Thus,  Caucasians  claim  to  have  significant  understanding  of  “forces” 
and continue to fight for the sake of surviving territorialization. However, that idea of 
“forces” seems to be rather far from the Neitzcheian or Deleuzian thinking of forces as 
spectrums of potential.    There is no acknowledgement of the  “lines of flight, movements of 
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deterritorialization and destratification,” only particular, self-justifying “lines of articulation 
or segmentarity, strata and territories” (Deleuze & Guattrari, 1987, p. 3) are legitimized.  In 
other words, Caucasians live in sharply defined borderlines, which they believe constitute 
part of their identity and whoever dares to confront or disrespect those lines is considered 
an evil other.    
 According to Deleuze and Guattari (1987), “binary logic and biunivocal 
relationships still dominate psychoanalysis, linguistics, structuralism, and even 
information science” (p. 5). People try to connect things that are not related to each other 
and, thus, create images of black and white pictures, polarized ideas, extreme ends that 
seem not to have anything in between and have no way to meet or co-exist.  Badiou 
(2003) calls that phenomenon a “profoundly illogical regime of communication” (p. 41) 
to which the whole world is submitted. In Neitzcheian (Deleuze, 1983) philosophy, such 
a regime enslaves masters and causes the negation of events and trends that do not justify 
one’s own state and actions, thus transforming active forces into reactive ones.  
Perhaps it is easier to negate multiplicity and live in contrasts when knowing that 
there is no alternative, knowing that things have proper names. The mainstream of the 
Caucasus depends heavily on the set of things that have proper names, are in the process 
of getting them, or soon will get them. This could be well illustrated by the popular 
Georgian beliefs, like, for instance, one about Abkhazia being considered part of 
Georgian territory, and, also, the idea that Georgia will soon be welcomed into the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and thus regain its territorial integrity. Following 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987), “the proper name can be nothing more than an extreme case 
of the common noun, containing its already domesticated multiplicity within itself and 
linking it to a being or object posited as unique” (p. 27). Hardly one, if any, of the 
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Caucasians would think that their identity could have multiple meanings, realizations, or 
could be in a constant, endless process of becoming—becoming-Georgian, becoming-
Armenian, becoming-Azerbaijanian, becoming-Abkhazian, etc. Thus, Caucasians are 
pretending to have the coherent identities of Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijanians, 
Abkhazians, etc. that have survived multiple conquerors and maintained their ethnic 
identity. However, their ethnic identity is not the same as it was a couple of centuries, or 
even decades ago, as events surrounding them happen, cultural, political aspirations 
change and means of self-expression develop. Thus, “are we not witnessing the first 
stirrings of a subsequent adventure, that of the Signifier, the devious despotic agency that 
substitutes itself for asignifying proper names and replaces multiplicities with the dismal 
unity of an object declared lost?” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 28). Caucasian’s 
identities are not lost; only certain elements that constituted them at a certain historical 
time are lost and dispersed. But despotic forces are not willing to let go, to affirm the 
loss, fearing this would shake their authority.  
 Nietzsche and Deleuze (1983) would call such a despotic force an exhausted one 
as it “does not have strength to affirm difference, a force which no longer acts but rather 
reacts to the forces which dominate it” (p. 9). For instance, the Georgian government 
does affirm that Abkhazian authorities are not under the influence of Russia, and their 
desire to be independent from Georgia is based on their desires and those of their civil 
society. Such neglecting of Abkhazian desire for independence does not imply any 
action; thus, it is more a reaction, a reaction to fear that it might not be able to act 
effectively. Such fear to act is similar to procrastination, but seems to be much more 
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pessimistic than procrastination, as it is a “genealogy taken up by slaves” (Deleuze, 1983, 
p. 55).  
Calling people who are in charge of a country “slaves” should not be surprising, 
as in Nietzscheian philosophy.  A reactive force that is related to negative will is called 
“slave” and affirmative will, sometimes with an active force, is called “master.” Master 
versus slave juxtaposition is not highly metaphorical, because, at least, based on the 
Georgian-Abkhazian or any other Caucasian conflict, one who does not affirm difference 
acknowledges a counterpart’s desires, seems to have much less potential of reaching any 
kind of breakthrough, and is thereby a slave of its own fears. Whereas, if one would 
surrender to the immanence of incorporeal transformation and affirm any combination in 
a dice-throw of a political game, one would have more control over the situation and 
thereby be a master. 
 However, there is an interesting phenomenon about slaves enslaving masters 
described in Nietzsche and Phylosophy (Deleuze, 1983), which can easily be illustrated 
by contemporary situations. “Reactive force, even when it obeys, limits active force, 
imposes limitations and partial restrictions on it and is already controlled by the spirit of 
negative” (Deleuze, 1983, p. 56). Again, returning to Caucasian conflicts and meetings of 
conflict resolution groups from the conflicting sides, one would easily notice how 
participants of those meetings surrender to incorporeal transformation of being equally 
biased, faulty in the conflict, and willing to reach social change. However, when going 
back to the place or origin and encountering negative spirit of friends, coworkers, family, 
neighbors, and the mainstream ideas, those “masters” of affirmative will and active force 
turn into “slaves” of dominant ideas. The reason for that is not only the influence of 
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dominant ideas of negative will, but the conformist nature of people, the fact that perhaps 
it is easier to be nihilist and have “bad consciousness” (Deleuze, 1983).  
 As Deleuze (1983) explains based on his analysis of Nietzsche, reactive force 
separates active force from what it can do, thus turning it into the reactive force, a slave 
that does not want to stop being a slave. This kind of phenomenon could be similar to the 
relation of minus and plus in mathematics. Minus turns plus into minus, but in 
comparison to math, two or multiple negative wills, reactive forces, so-called slaves, do 
not turn into masters as it happens in math when two or more even minuses turn into plus. 
Deleuze (1983) says that we have the hierarchy we deserve. Hierarchy that “also 
designates the triumph of reactive forces, the contagion of reactive forces and the 
complex organization which results – where the weak have conquered, where the strong 
are contaminated, where the slave who has not stopped being a slave prevails over the 
master who has stopped being one…” (Deleuze, 1983, pp. 60-61). 
 When looking closer, such contamination of strong and noble, and its 
transformation into dialectic resentment, resembles the arborescent root system of the tree 
of the absurdity. Every enslaved master becomes part of the arborescent root system, 
which has mystification, falsification, and absurdity as the main principles. From the 
point of view of contaminated affirmative will, none of the tree-like structure can be 
noble, because it is based on one main principle. But there cannot be one main principle, 
there can only be a multiplicity of principles that may form unity or go beyond the unity.  





Inscribed on the plane of consistency are haecceities, events, 
incorporeal transformations that are apprehended in themselves; 
nomadic essences, vague yet rigorous; continuums of intensities or 
continuous, variations, which go beyond constants and variables; 
becomings, which have neither culmination nor subject, but draw one 
another into zones of proximity or undecidability; smooth spaces, 
composed from within striated space. We will say that a body without 
organs, or bodies without organs (plateaus) comes into play in 
individuation by and haecceity, in the production of intensities 
beginning at a degree zero, in the matter of variation, in the medium of 
becoming or transformation, and in the smoothing of space. A 
powerful nonorganic life that escapes the strata, cuts across 
assemblages, and draws an abstract line without contour, a line of 
nomad art and itinerant metallurgy. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 507)  
 
 This kind of philosophy that deterritorializes discourses could be rather useful and 
timely in the Caucasus where sharp lines are drawn between various territories, social 
layers, ways of thinking, talking, and acting. Haecceity could open up new possibilities to 
the deadlocked conflicts that too much adhere to the lines of distinction and 
territorialization literally and figuratively. To better understand how haecceity and 
intensities of multiple plateaus could create new opportunities, a more detailed analysis 
of the Caucasian conflicts should be provided. For that, the next subsections will 
overview the historical background of the Caucasus, including separations between 
newly independent republics and their territorial entities, the violence that followed those 
desires of separations, and the deadlocked situations that are usually named as peace 
processes in the Caucasus. 	   	  
Overview of the Historical Background 
This section will look into the past of the South Caucasus to find the origins of the 
contemporary conflicts in the region and their potential resolutions. This multi-ethnic 
region, with its numerous ethnic conflicts, was unified as a single political entity twice – 
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during the Russian Civil War (Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic) from 9 
April 1918 to 26 May 1918, and under Soviet rule (Transcaucasian SFSR) from 12 
March 1922 to 5 December 1936. However, Caucasian ethnic groups rarely refer to these 
periods when they were represented by a single political entity, and mainly use history as 
their weapon for winning the zero-sum debate about who is guilty in the past and current 
unresolved conflict. Despite the presence of controversy and the infiltration of ethnic 
strife into historical accounts, some scholars still see the resolutions of the current 
conflicts through the formation of a South Caucasian Confederation (Akhvlediani, 2009), 
where every ethnic group would be able to maintain its identity and equal status. At 
present, the creation of a South Caucasian Confederation seems a rather remote and 
unrealistic possibility.  
One of the very few aspects to be considered as common in the history of the 
Caucasian nations themselves is that the region has been under the great threat of 
assimilation by big neighbor states since ancient times. The Caucasian nations, which 
constitute a broad ethnic diversity, take pride in their constant resistance in saving their 
national identity, territory, and in the cases of Georgia and Armenia, their Christian 
Orthodox religion. However, resistance was not only against outside regions, but inside 
as well, where small neighbor nations were considered to present the same potential 
threats to their national identity and territorial integrity. 
The memory of a turbulent and so-called “heroic” history constituting the national 
identity of the small South Caucasus nations was deliberately suppressed during Soviet 
times. The question of nationality was one of the taboo themes under the USSR, and 
ethnic differences were not allowed into open discussions (interview with Kerim Ankos, 
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chairman of the Kurds association in Georgia, June 16, 2006). “Convergence of all 
classes and social strata, juridical and practical equality of all nations, and their fraternal 
collaboration” (Supreme Council of USSR, 1977) was the major axiom of the regime, 
which excluded any possibility for ethnic conflicts. Drujba narodov (friendship of 
peoples) under the patronage of “big brother Russia” was propagated through politics, 
culture, and mass media. Even the USSR national anthem pointed to the “the stronghold 
of the friendship of the peoples” (Iakoutsky, September 11, 2006) as the most crucial 
element of Soviet statehood. This Soviet propaganda of the “friendship of peoples” 
among Soviet Republics was demonstrated, for example, through the chorus of the 
USSR’s anthem: 
 “Be glorified, our fatherland, united and free! 
 The sure bulwark of the friendship of the peoples! 
 The Soviet banner is the flag of the people, 
 Let it lead from victory to victory!” (Iakoutsky, September 11, 2006) 
 
Efforts to maintain the unity of the various ethnic groups were not only 
ideological but cartographic as well. Borders on political maps were redrawn and the 
statuses of ethnic groups changed. To the north of the then Soviet Socialist Republic 
(SSR) of Georgia, the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast (AO), the northwest 
Abkhazian Soviet Social Republic, and the Ajarian Autonomous Soviet Social Republic 
(ASSR) in the west of Georgia, were created in the early 20th century. SSR Azerbaijan 
acquired the Nakhichevan ASSR, an exclave in Armenia, and the Armenian majority 
populated the Nagorno-Karabakh AO. Georgian historians will declare that both 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia have belonged to Georgia since ancient times, and that the 
Soviet Union tore away those territories from their monolithic territory; however, the 
Abkhazians and South Ossetians claim that the USSR attached them to Georgia without 
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consulting them, as they were not then aligned with Georgia at that time, and already had 
aspirations towards a certain level of independence. Similarly, dialectic discourses are 
present in the current Armenian-Azeri debate about Nagorno-Karabakh. Christoph 
Zürcher (2007), like many other scholars, argues that the USSR employed a “divide and 
rule” principle. Zürcher (2007) claims that a “system of administrative territorial division 
had given the Soviet leadership an instrument for the control and stifling of national 
ambitions” (p. 31). In other words, these various ethnic groups’ peaceful coexistence was 
not the result of mutual understanding between them, but of the Kremlin’s compulsion.  
As Suzanne Goldenberg writes (1994), the “situation in Nagorno-Karabakh 
provides the most extreme example of the inherent dangers when the conflicts contained 
during the Soviet period become active again” (p. 8). Since the medieval period, the 
territory of Nagorno-Karabakh has been populated with both Armenian and Turkic 
nations, with changes in its demographics time after time (Cornell, 1999). However, 
ordinary people of the current conflicting nations got along well, and their cultures and 
their traditions became rather intertwined. If we were to believe Stepan Lisitsian (1992), 
Karabakhi Armenians sometimes even practiced polygamy, like the Karabakhi Azeris, 
and gave their children Muslim names. But in 1918–20, there were a series of short wars 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, which only ended with the 
intervention of the Soviet Army.2  
Similar to Nagorno-Karabakh’s case, some blame Soviet politics for seeding 
current conflicts in Georgia (Wright, 1996) by creating autonomous entities. However, I 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2  Public International Law & Policy Group and the New England Center for International  






would argue that the Soviets’ cannot be blamed for creating the roots of the conflicts, 
because origins of the rivalry were already present in pre-Soviet times; not addressing 
preexisting conflictive issues only contributed to the future wars between Georgians and 
Abkhazians, and between Georgians and South Ossetians.  
The South Ossetian ethnic group is believed to be descendants of the Alans, a 
Sarmatian tribe related to Iranians that have lived in the northern part of Georgia since 
the Middle Ages (Lang, 1966). In the mid-19th century, the Roki Tunnel was built on 
South Ossetian-inhabited territory between Georgia and Russia, which allowed South 
Ossetians to first develop a pro-Russian orientation, creating strong ties with the North 
Ossetians that resided inside Russia (De Waal, 2010). In 1918-1920, South Ossetians 
staged three uprisings, announced their detachment from Menshevik Georgia, and stated 
their desire to join Bolshevik Russia. However, with the creation of the Soviet Union, 
they were attached to Georgian territory and remained calm during the Soviet era. 
The Abkhazian case was similar to the South Ossetian case in terms of its 
attachment to Georgia and the resistance it created from both Georgian and Abkhazian 
sides. In contrast to South Ossetia, even before the Soviet Union, Russia had high 
interests in potential Abkhazian natural resources and tourism, and were accompanied by 
Abkhazia’s desire for autonomy (De Wall, 2010). 
In the 9th to the 6th centuries BC, the territory of modern Abkhazia was part of 
the ancient Georgian kingdom of Colchis ("Kolkha"); since then, Abkhazia has been 
colonized by the Greeks, Romans, Byzantines, and Ottomans (Suny, 1994). In the 
beginning of the 19th century, the Abkhazians faced total invasion from the Ottomans, so 
they wrote to the Tsar requesting the joining of Abkhazia to Russia for protection against 
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the Turks.  On 8 July 1810, the Russian army freed Sukhumi from Turkish control (Cade, 
2009). In spite of this initial appeal for Russian protection, since Tsarist times up to the 
Soviet period, various deportations of ethnic Abkhazians were organized by Russian 
decision-makers.  As a result, by the mid-20th century, Abkhazians became an ethnic 
minority in their own Abkhazia, among Georgians, Armenians, Russians, Greeks, and 
Jews. By then, there was almost nothing left to do to revive the ethnic Abkhazian 
population, especially under the “Georgianization”3 of Abkhazia imposed by the USSR, 
especially under Joseph Stalin and Lavrenty Beria (De Waal, 2010, p. 151).  
 Despite the entire deep-rooted incentives for ethnic rivalry in the South Caucasus, a 
certain level of multinational harmony was created, and World War II played a major role 
in this. The intense involvement and high death toll suffered by South Caucasian troops 
during World War II contributed to the replacement of ancient heroisms of the little 
nations with the contemporary braveries that were highly interconnected with the USSR.  
According to Thomas De Waal (2010), “this joint experience of war probably made 
Transcaucasian peoples feel a fully Soviet identity for the first time” (p. 86). 
 Nonetheless, each of the current breakaway territories conducted protests in every 
decade since the 1950s (De Waal, 2010; Kaufman, 2001), with demands of secession and 
national identity defense.  However, they did not have the military potential for 
transforming their protests into conflicts with the Soviet Union that was still more or less 
managing them. At the time, conflicts in the South Caucasus were unimaginable, as it 
was unimaginable that the Soviet Union would break down.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3  Abkhazia’s autonomy during USSR was rather nominal, and under the rule of Stalin and Beria 





 Another origin for the current de-facto breakaway republics being more trustful of 
and reliant on Russia is that during the Soviet Union, those who could not advance in 
career or receive a desired education ended up moving to Moscow. After the death of 
Stalin and the execution of Beria, the state of ethnic minorities in South Caucasus slightly 
improved. Georgian party chief Eduard Shevardnadze publicly denounced “the policy 
towards the Abkhazian nation” and called it “chauvinistic,” and “against the interests of 
both the Georgian and Abkhazian nations” (Glebov & Crowfoot, 1989, p. 79).  This 
statement was a great breakthrough in conflict prevention and was also followed by 
implementations of promises given by Shevardnadze: a new Abkhazian state university 
was founded, Abkhaz broadcasting was introduced, and quotas were created for ethnic 
Abkhazians in governing structures. These actions satisfied certain needs of the Abkhaz 
population and calmed down interethnic strife (but sparked Georgian jealousy and 
nationalism, as Georgians themselves most of the time had fears similar to other nations 
in the Caucasus—namely, fears of ethnic erosion, perhaps caused by the small size of 
their territory further fragmenting into even smaller entities.  There have always been a 
very small number of ethnic Georgians that have precariously persevered against 
overwhelming powers both to the north and the south, throughout thousands of years of 
history. Similar gestures have not been made in Nagorno-Karabakh by the Azerbaijani 
leadership, though up until the 1980s, the ethnic balance between Armenians and the 
Azeris within the autonomous territorial and administrative entity had been stable, and 
hope had remained that the trend would continue (Yamskov, 1991, p. 647).   
 The preconflict origins for South Ossetia were the fewest compared to the other two 
conflicts in the South Caucasus. With highly intermixed villages of Georgians and South 
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Ossetians, the South Ossetian’s fluency in Georgian language, the high rate of 
intermarriages, the Roki tunnel linking South Ossetia with North Ossetia, South 
Ossetians “had no incentive for conflict” (Interview with Ljyana Teddeva, journalist from 
South Ossetia, 2007, March).  
 
Separation 
I don’t remember the sound of fight 
and artillery. I remember the smell of 
blood, burn, and decomposition in my 
native village… Even now after so 
many years I still sense it when I 
drive near by… 
—Ljyana Teddeva mother 
of four from South Ossetia 
 
In the late 1980s, very few could notice and even fewer people, if any, could talk 
about the nationalism that polluted space, blurred vision, and pulled the peoples of the 
Caucasus into three secessive conflicts that killed several thousands, and wounded, 
expelled, and internally displaced many more. Unfortunately, the selective memory, the 
distorted and partial perceptions, and the blindness of the late 1980s and early 1990s still 
persist and continue to thrive today. Scholars still tend to ascribe the tensions in the 
Caucasus to preliminary fixed-subject positions (Feldman, 1991) and not the ideologies 
of space that disconnect political intent from political consequence (Feldmam, 1991, p. 
20).  
For instance, some scholars believe that glasnost  (openness) unleashed the 
nationalism that had been contained during the Soviet decades (Balance, 1997).  Other 
others blame an ideological vacuum that was filled by nationalism (Ciobanu, 2009), and 
still others point to economic, social, and political injustices to which the current 
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breakaway territories were exposed (Herzig, 1999; Kaufman, 2001). However, I would 
argue this kind of thinking leaves out essential dynamics that created harsh intolerance 
and inter-ethnic strife in the South Caucasus; regarding Northern Ireland, scholars such as 
Hewitt (1981) and O’Hearn (1983) omit “important factors in the escalation of 
intercommunal violence between 1969 and 1979” (Feldman, 1991, p. 21).  
 Not that the aforementioned factors are irrelevant; I would not deny that Armenians 
outside and inside Nagorno-Karabakh feared that the number of Azeris was rising, that 
there was a perception of a deprivation of cultural rights and starvation of resources, and 
that anxieties around potential erasure of Armenian national identity were high. And I 
would not deemphasize the role of glasnost that allowed Armenians and Azerbaijanis to 
raise their voices more loudly against each other in the form of mass protests.  But, all 
these are smaller pieces of a bigger picture, an ideology of space. All these different 
factors are floating independently, occasionally interacting with each other in space, 
rendering a much more complex collection of influences.  Parallels could be drawn with 
what Feldman (1991) calls “indigenous cultural practice,” wherein “Protests meant to 
agitate for civil rights, civil space, and an ethnically neutral jural subject were received as 
assertions of ethnicity by both their supporters and opponents” (p. 22). These processes in 
Armenia and Azerbaijan were similar to Georgia, where a national movement lead by the 
dissident Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the son of a popular Georgian novelist, was reaching its 
peak like a snowball. Movement started on the top of the hill and became an 
uncontrollable avalanche that would destroy everything in its way. 
The violence that followed this “snowball” was the material reproduction of the 
context of the late 1980s where there was no place or anticipation for war. I would agree 
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with Feldman that subject positions are “contracted and construed by violent 
performances…chronic violence transforms material and experiential contexts” 
(Feldman, 1991, p. 20). However, I would argue against Feldman’s (1991) claim that 
violence “renders the relations between structure and events, text and context, 
consciousness and practice, labile and unfixed” (Feldman, 1991, p. 20). If applied to the 
postwars situation in the South Caucasus, the relations between the structures and events 
in the Caucasus during the wars could have been labile and unfixed, but not afterwards. 
Perhaps, because of the sharpness and intensity of their war experiences, peoples’ 
feelings became blunt in postwar everyday life, which was perceived as being much 
duller than their previous war existences. So, they live in their past, locked in their own 
perceptions of the conflicts that formed during the times of violence. The results of such 
locked perceptions for development thinking could be easily traced to the 2008 war in 
Georgia and the negotiation processes that keep Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia in a 
deadlock of conflict resolution.  
 
                                             Violence in the Caucasus and Political  
                                                           Use of Human Bodies 
    People are as inventive in devising 
torture and other atrocities as they are 
in any other fields of activity... 
                —Kaufman  (2001, p. 122) 
 
Following the first precondition of the violent conflict—that of “communal 
content”—one would have to conclude that certain individual interests were mediated 
through the membership of social groups, i.e., conflict moved towards more communal 
than liberal values. One example for Georgians would be maintaining the importance of 
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the Georgian language in the autonomous republic of Abkhazia. By contrast, Abkhazians 
wish to preserve their own language against Georgian discrimination, and strengthen their 
ethnic and cultural self-identity.  To realize these and other interests, individuals joined 
nationalistic groups, which pushed this idea of linguistic and cultural preservation further, 
unified their interests, and transformed these ideas into “societal needs,” thus causing 
“disarticulation” (Azar, 1990, cited in Ramsbotham et al., 2005) between the Soviet 
Union and Georgian and Abkhaz societies; this disarticulation further fueled 
fragmentation and caused what Azar calls “Protracted Social Conflict.”  
 However, not all Azarian preconditions fit the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. 
Georgia’s “international linkages” in the early 1990s, particularly its linkage to Russia 
over Western states, could easily be considered as one of the preconditions for the wars in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Despite the fact that the Soviet Union had finally broken up, 
in the early 1990s, Georgia was still heavily geopolitically dependent on Russia; 
however, this factual dependence was hardly realized by the ethnocentric government of 
Georgia at that time. Thus, Abkhazians allied with Russians and North Caucasians and 
banished Georgians from Abkhazia.  
All of the Azarian preconditions are revealed through certain events and a 
“process of dynamics,” which according to the theory of Protracted Social Conflict, are 
grouped into three categories of determinants:  
1). “Communal actions and strategies,” which involve various processes of 
identity group and political goals formations, and in accordance with that of the emerging 
leadership; 
2). “State actions and strategies,” which possibly involve “coercive repression” 
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and “instrumental co-option” as ways of reaching political goals; 
3). “Built in mechanisms of conflict,” which are “experiences, fears and belief 
systems” that generate negative images and solidify protracted social conflict (Azar, 
1990, cited in Ramsbotham et al., 2005, p. 87-88).  
In the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, “built-in mechanisms of conflict” (Azar, 
1990, cited in Ramsbotham et al., 2005, p. 87) included dehumanizing propaganda that 
took place on both sides, and tended to attribute the worst motivations and actions to the 
opposing side. Each side exploited history in ways that favored and justified their own 
actions. 
 Once the conflicts in the Caucasus entered the military confrontation phase, 
stopping the growth of this nationalistic snowball became impossible. The inevitable 
increase of victims resulting from these military confrontations resulted in an abundance 
of martyrs as powerful symbols of the torture, rape, etc., that justified their own 
atrocities. What Feldman (1991) writes regarding the formations of violence in Northern 
Ireland is likewise applicable to the Caucasus: “As much as the violence occurred over 
the modes and methods of symbolization constructed by the Blanketmen as occurred over 
the issues being symbolized” (Feldman, 1991, p. 165).  The human body became a key 
object in the creation of these powerful political symbols. As Feldman (1991) says, “the 
body as the terminal locus of power also defines the place for redirection and reversal of 
power” (p. 178).  Power forms and regulates subject positions through the economy of 
body, which involves bodies being “coded and recoded, folded and unfolded by violence 
given and violence received” (Feldman, 1991, p. 146).  However, each side of the 
conflict speaks almost nothing about “violence given,” i.e., violence inflicted on others, 
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“victims” who vary from conflict to conflict.  
 One such popular Georgian narrative concerns the allegedly “common practice” 
among Abkhazian militants during the Georgian-Abkhazian war of inflicting an "Italian 
necktie," in which the tongue is cut out of the throat and tied around the neck. Catherine 
Dale was the first scholar to have interviewed a number of refugees, and she has written 
about the "Italian necktie" and other horror stories in her 1997 UN Refugee Agency 
(UNHCR) account. She refers to a number of horror stories that support the official 
Georgian claim that Abkhazians committed an ethnic cleansing of Georgians. Some of 
the narratives include stories about Abkhazian soldiers having sex with dead bodies, 
playing football with the heads of killed children, and numerous stories of rape. As those 
cases continue to be repeated from generation to generation, they do not focus on 
achieving empathy towards the conflict victims, but rather aggression and hatred towards 
those who allegedly implemented them, in this case, the Abkhazians. Such aggression 
against people on the other side of the conflict, in the conditions of an informational 
vacuum, creates de-humanizing propaganda. I myself, when working as a journalist, have 
often heard from those who tell such horror stories, “How can a human play a football 
with the head of other human? They are not human and they do not deserve to be treated 
as humans!” 
 A similar trend of demonizing propaganda is taking place on the other side of the 
conflict. A bit lighter but still rather horrifying stories could be found in Abkhazian 
narratives that are less frequently published than Georgian ones in the international media 
and academic world, probably because of Abkhazia’s weaker public relations capacity 
and authority on the international stage. One of the most frequently cited among 
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Abkhazian sources of Georgian war atrocities is Vitalii Sharia’s (1993) collection of 
stories. This collection includes stories like the following: “Nodar Ashuba, a police 
major, in September 1992, was taken by Okhureyan4  Svans5 to the center of town and 
was brutally killed by them: they cut off his fingers, ripped out his heart, and poked out 
his eyes” (Sharia, 1993, Svidetelstvuyut jhertvij agresiyi [Victims of Aggression are 
Testifying], para. 37). One of numerous horror accounts is the story about the warlord 
“Babu” [grandfather], who according to Sharia (1993), while proclaimed a national hero 
in Georgia, led a gang of drug addicted, sadist militants like himself: “among his victims 
was Abkhazian beauty Rimma Djobava, who was raped by 8 Georgian militants in front 
of her husband’s (who was a Megrelian6) Geno Samushia’s eyes. Geno was trying to 
protect her. They cut her leg when she was still alive and then burnt their house with 
them inside the house” (Sharia, 1993, Svidetelstvuyut jhertvij agresiyi [Victims of 
Aggression are Testifying], para. 43). 
 These themes of rape, torture, and murder are repeated in many separate accounts, 
but none of them are supported by international war-crime investigation; therefore, they 
cannot be considered as real facts. Even Catherine Dale (1997), who tells many horror 
stories that give base to flourishing stereotypes that deepen the chasm between war-
divided societies, says, “but after the war, and perhaps more importantly, popular 
understandings of violence have been both made more concrete through association with 
daily hardships, and generalized through shared retellings” (p. 108).  Despite Catherine 
Dale’s pragmatic assumption here, generally, her account builds towards Georgian and 
Abkhazian claims about the dehumanization of the “other” side of the conflict. However, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 A village in the Ochamchira district, in North-East Abkhazia. 
5 A subgroup of mountainous Georgians who speak the Svan language. 
6 Megrelians are representatives of a Georgian subgroup speaking Megrelian language.  
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it should be noted that the Georgian narrative, in Dale’s (1997) and many other scholars’ 
accounts, takes much more space and involves many more emotions than Abkhazian 
stories. Thus, it seems that Georgian horror stories of the wars in Abkhazia and even 
South Ossetia are given priority. 
 It is rather hard to ignore horror stories about war atrocities, but it should not be 
forgotten where such belief in these horror stories takes us. As Feldman (1991) points 
out, “subversive mimesis subjects the ‘model’ to the detours and diversions of simulation, 
which can detach mimetic practice from any external or originary reference. This 
detachment, this transformation of power’s re-presentation into novel political 
presentation, becomes a project of self-emancipation” (p. 179). 
 In the Georgian case, this “project of self-emancipation” (Feldman, 1991, p. 179) to 
which Dale and other scholars have contributed has gained some tangible results: the 
ethnic cleansing and massacres of Georgians has been officially recognized by the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) conventions in 1994, 
1996, and again in 1997 during the Budapest, Lisbon, and Istanbul summits, where they 
condemned the “perpetrators of war crimes committed during the conflict” (Resolution of 
the OSCE Budapest Summit, OSCE, 1994-12-06, retrieved from 
http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1994/12/4048_en.pdf). 
 Georgian and Abkhazian officials are still actively expatiating human bodies, the 
symbols of ethnic cleansing. Thus, to borrow Feldman’s (1991) paraphrase of Sartre: “it 
is not only a matter of what history does to the body but what subjects do with what 
history has done to the body” (p. 177).  Obviously, Feldman’s (1991) H-block narratives 
about violence inflicted on Irish prisoners are rather compelling, but I would argue 
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against Feldman’s claim that these stories “encompass experience that cannot be 
incorporated into traditional political ideology” (p. 179).  Stories of violence, if paralleled 
with Georgian-Abkhazia, Georgian-South Ossetian, or Armenian-Azeri cases, all use the 
human body as an artifact, a symbol that victimizes and justifies belligerent sides of the 
conflict, thereby returning scholars to traditional notions of the empowered victim 
battling a simplified oppressor. Such self-righteous and belligerent attitudes among the 
participants of the bloody wars in the Caucasus continue, and are having counter-
productive effects towards the peace processes. 
 
Peace Processes in the Caucasus 
Through the mediation of international organizations, and a significant decrease 
in armor, soldiers, militants, civilian death tolls, and forced displacements, by the mid-
1990s, the South Caucasian conflicts had frozen and given way to peace processes. Each 
peace process varied by the mediators, parties, dynamics, and commitment, but most of 
the time had one characteristic in common, i.e., firmness in defending their own position 
no matter the circumstance. Thus, these peace processes neither enhance the parties’ 
capacity to listen to each other, nor understand the claims of the other side; doing so was 
believed to be equal to agreeing with and legitimating the opposition’s assertions.  As 
opposed to a real conversation, each side was engaged in what Dr. Leonard Hawes (2010) 
calls “Witnessing, rather than merely waiting and then rushing into a narrative with a 
speaking turn, [which] is a particularly challenging discipline in multicultural, 
multilingual long-term conversations, negotiations, mediations, and dialogues” (Hawes, 
2010, p. 277). The existence of such a chasm in communications between the sides 
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protracted over the years and created feelings of futility and, thereby, contributed to the 
formation of belligerent intentions as the only justified ways of conflict resolution. What 
eventually resulted in August 2008 was war in Georgia.  
What could have caused such a “spoiling behavior” (Richmond, 2006) of 
Georgians, Abkazians, South Ossetians, Armenians, and Azeri’s? According to 
Richmond (2006), asymmetry of disputants could be one of the powerful reasons for 
“devious objectives” that cause spoiling behavior. Richmond reaches closer to the 
Caucasian picture as he goes on to say that the “…scenario becomes all the more 
complex because of the fact that one party may represent an internationally recognized 
entity, and therefore control all of the machinery of a state, while the other is viewed as 
rebel, secessionist or insurgent” (p. 63). Georgia is an internationally recognized state, 
whereas its breakaway territories are considered de-facto; thus, the international 
community can already be considered to be taking a pro-Georgian stance. Thus, the 
Abkhazian and South Ossetian sides are many times not perceived as parties to the 
conflicts.  
In this section, I will lay out several of the main developments in the South 
Caucasian peace processes that will provide some explanation for the existing deadlocks 
in this small geographic region.  Georgian-Abkhazian negotiations, known as the 
“Geneva Peace Process,” chaired by the UN, facilitated by Russia, and observed by the 
OSCE and the “Group of Friends” (US, Germany, UK, France, and Russia) created three 
working groups on the nonresumption of violence, the return of refugees and internally	  displaced	  people (IDPs), and economic issues, in 1997.  However, the sides not being 
willing to listen and in their view to thereby “legitimize” the other side’s claims became 
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locked in a stalemate over the political status of Abkhazia. Georgians have always been 
considering Abkhazia to be an inalienable part of Georgia with at most the status of an 
autonomous republic, whereas Abkhazians insisted that negotiations be about the 
reconstruction of state and legal relations between the two republics rather than the 
political status of Abkhazia within Georgia. This deadlock created a gap in the peace 
process. The freezing of negotiations at that time, which was seen as a drawback, later 
proved to be a better position than what followed after the renewal of peace talks.  This 
part of negotiations will be reviewed later on in the essay. 
The Georgian-South Ossetian peace process was mainly implemented by the Joint 
Control Commission (JCC) created in 1992, a quadrilateral body comprised of Georgian, 
Russian, and North and South Ossetian representatives, in addition to participation from 
the OSCE. The JCC’s main objectives, similar to the Georgian-Abkhazia case, were 
divided into three parts: military and security matters, economic rehabilitation of the zone 
of conflict, and establishing conditions for the return of refugees and IDPs. The 
negotiation process was characterized as protracted inactivity. However, this peace 
process could be described as more “peaceful” than the one that took place after 2004. In 
July 2004, the new Georgian government’s antismuggling operation of taking down the 
informal marketplace Ergneti on the de-facto border escalated into fighting between 
Georgian and Ossetian troops. As De Waal (2010) says, the closure of the Ergneti market 
by the Georgian government “cut off grassroots Georgian and Ossetian relations at a 
stroke” (p. 202). Having traveled several times to Ergneti as a journalist, I have seen how 
thousands of Georgians and Ossetians were gathering everyday engaging in wholesales 
of wheat, petrol, cigarettes, Russian candies, and other consumer goods, that were tax-
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free. I heard Georgian, Ossetian, and Russian all spoken at once, as many of the local 
farmers from both sides of the conflict were also selling agriculture produce. The market 
did no good for the Georgian state budget, but it was the only place in which those 
particular conflict-divided societies jointly earned their living.  
From the economic and antismuggling point of view, the operation contributed to 
more polarization of the conflicting parties. Isolation of the conflicting sides created an 
informational vacuum, that are the ideal conditions for developing higher levels of 
misperceptions that helped me to understand what Richmond calls “devious objectives.” 
“Factors that shape and distort perception, such as stereotyping, selective perception, 
projection, and perceptual defense” (Richmond, 2006, p. 62) were caused by the need of 
both Georgian and South Ossetian sides to fill in the gap created by isolation. Each party 
tried to do it the way that would justify their position, not taking into consideration 
implications like further polarization between them.  
A similar process of protracted misperception was also occurring among 
Georgians, Abkhazians, Armenians, and Azerbaijanians. De Waal (2003) makes the link 
between the protracted misperception of war-divided communities in Armenia, 
Azerbiajan, and their governments. He refers to “a kind of slow suicide pact” (De Waal, 
2003, p. 3), wherein the leaders from both sides of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
continue to be held hostages of public reaction, and cannot move the conflict towards 
reconciliation. In Deleuzo-Guattarian words, the war machines of the South Caucasus are 
producing a movement that holds its smooth space instead of letting South Caucasians be 
held by the local movement in their space (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 363). War 
machines that are “distributed by turbulence across a smooth space” (Deleuze & Guattari, 
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1987, p. 363) and those same machines are yielding a deadlock to be unpacked in the 
next chapter.  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  









This chapter looks through the lenses of the affirmative philosophy of Deleuze, 
Guattarri, and Nietzsche in attempts to shed light on the media aspect of the South 
Caucasian war machines. It also aims to de-territorialize cyber attacks as Deleuzian 
“vacuoles of noncommunication” (1995, p. 175) aimed at interrupting the war machine’s 
workflow and at the same time being part of another war machine.  At first, this section 
will discuss the arborescence of militarism, appropriated by the reactive forces in the 
South Caucasus, which unwittingly become transcendental “slaves” (Deleuze, 1983) to 
the nomadic war machines. Those war machines, however, do not imply solely state 
armies or guerillas, but rather are based on actions and existences of everyday individual 
life in the Caucasus, which is invisibly directed by mainstream ideas about national 
identity and territorial integrity. Those mainstream ideas leave out any possibility of 
alternative thought and thus result in destructive war machines, which seem to be 
impossible to deactivate. The lines of one-sidedness logically merge into militarism in 
striated space, which could be traced to the lines of an instant communication network in 
the smooth space keeping societies in a constant state of modulation through popular 
culture and mainstream media. The section will then move to analyzing why one, in these 
circumstances of enslaving communication, would be willing to break the vicious cycle 
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and to “hijack speech” (Deleuze, 1995, p. 175), to conduct virtual sit-ins like those that 
reactive forces have already labeled as the cyber war.7  
Before examining Caucasian militarism, which is a part of the war machines, it is 
important to note that none of the South Caucasian nation-states or their breakaway 
territories consider themselves reactive, militarist forces, officially. War machine/s as 
such have never been recognized. They rather accentuate their desire to solve ethnic and 
territorial conflicts peacefully. However, they never stop arming, training soldiers, 
striving to get accepted into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). They 
remain transcendent to the point where they will be winners in the conflicts because they 
are poised to take advantage of opportunities to succeed in war. Ongoing sedentary media 
coverage, another part of the war machines, is well suited to ensure the smoothness of the 
militarist process through the creation of war-machine-justifying sedentary contexts. In a 
simplified sense, they mostly mean to maintain a “frightened, confused and misinformed 
public” (Buchanan in Buchanan & Parr, 2006, p. 22). 
Why do the nation-states remain on their roads of militarism that produce 
belligerence among their populations if they claim they are willing to resolve conflicts 
peacefully but continue to spend billions of dollars from their own budgets and those of 
international organizations to support their preparations for war? This phenomenon, 
seemingly paradoxical at first glance, could be understood more thoroughly through the 
application of the war machine (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987) concept. It should be noted 
that even though nation-states appropriate war machines, eventually, they lose control. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Cyber attacks on the websites of the Georgian president, government, and mainstream media that 
coincided with the conventional war between Georgia and Russia in August 2008 are argued to constitute 
the precedent of cyber war (Clarke, 2009; Hollis, 2011; Zoller, 2009). 
31 
 
The reason is the nomadic nature of the war machine, which makes it impossible to 
regulate. As Deleuze and Guattari say:  
…even though the nomadic trajectory may follow trails or customary routes, it 
does not fulfill the function of the sedentary road, which is to parcel out a closed 
space to people, assigning each person a share and regulating the 
communication between shares. The nomadic trajectory does the opposite: it 
distributes people (or animals) in an open space, one that is indefinite and 
noncommunicating. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 380). 
 
If applied to Caucasian conflicts, and perhaps to any other conflicts, war 
machines, once fights break out and injustices occur, pull in more and more people, ideas, 
and movements as parts of the war machine. This war machine moves in an open, 
indefinite space in tandem with the other, similar war machine on the other side of the 
conflict. It should be noted that neither of them are sedentary, territorialized state armies, 
but rather noncontrollable and deterritorialized, a nomadic mix of guerrilla troops, 
civilian armed groups, mafiosi gangs, individual revengers, journalists, politicians, and 
others. The existence of a similar nomadic war machine on the other side of a conflict 
does not mean that those two are in a state of communication and information sharing. 
People living in those divided societies follow news of their own side and see the 
opposing side through the dark lenses of one-sided, distorted media coverage. Thus, 
media coverage turns out to be in an informational vacuum, a space of 
noncommunicating as Deleuze and Guattari say (1987).  
For a closer look at the origins of the contemporary conflicts in the Caucasus and 
the functionality of the war machines on that land, Merab Mamardashvili,8 a Georgian 
philosopher, provides a similar concept to that of the war machine—the mechanism—that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Up to now it was not possible to locate any published manuscripts of Merab Mamardashvili in the English 
language. The reason, perhaps, is in his preference for live talks, in the form of lectures and interviews, as 
he believed that there was a huge difference between the written and spoken word. 
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could be helpful. During the prewars period of the early 1990s, Mamardashvili was 
ringing bells of alarm due to the fractioning among Georgian political parties and multi-
ethnic populations that were taking place in striated space, right after the break-up of the 
Soviet Union, in a hive of nationalistic pressures. With the major support of ethnic 
majorities, authorities of the newly born nation-states of the South Caucasus helped 
compose a smooth space for the recently unleashed war machines, which they eventually 
proved to be incapable of controlling. What was at first anticipated to be a limited war, 
morphed into “so-called total war” and transformed the relationship between aim and 
object (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 421). To translate that into Caucasian ontology, war 
machine unleashers were thinking of ensuring territorial integrity and ethnic identity, 
before starting to build newly independent states, but then found themselves sinking in 
the rhizomatic roots of uncontrollable violence and injustices, which had war itself as 
their main principle. Again, going back to Deleuze and Guattari (1987), “when total war 
becomes the object of the appropriated war machine, then at this level in the set of all 
possible conditions, the object and the aim enter into new relations that can reach the 
point of contradiction” (p.421). This contradiction is between initial goal—ensuring 
territorial integrity/salvation of the ethnic identity, and actual goal—destruction; initial 
controller—the state and eventual ruler, and the war machine. As Buchanan says, “it 
effectively subsumes the state, making it just one of its many moving parts” (Buchanan 
as cited in Buchanan & Parr, 2006, p. 31).  Governments of those Caucasian conflicting 
sides still remain hostages of the public opinion they helped create throughout the history, 
and therefore prove to be one of the moving parts of the war machines. 
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Some may argue that war machines are now stopped and bring up the fact that 
there is no armed conflict or mass killings going on right now. But “war does not 
necessarily have the battle as its object, and more importantly, the war machine does not 
necessarily have war as its object, although war and the battle may be its necessary 
result” (p. 416) as Deleuze and Guattari (1987) point out. In response to that, others may 
even claim that there have never been war machines unleashed, only one-sided 
oppression, and claim that those who believe in war machines are anti-Georgian, anti-
Armenian, anti-Azerbaijanian, etc. As it is rather unimaginable for Caucasians to accept 
someone’s neutrality; “you are either with us or against us” has been the dominant 
thinking for the past decades.  
Thus, nonacknowledgement of one-sidedness, the win/lose approach, and the 
dynamics of the nomadic war machines prove that Mamardashvili’s9 statements of the 
1990s are still relevant today: “the [war] mechanism is in full swing and is beating the 
hammer into our heads, we should do something to stop it before it causes more dramatic 
results”10 (Tsiteli Zona [red zone] March 12, 2010). Unfortunately, Mamardashvili’s 
words were not adhered to and the “more dramatic results” (Tsiteli Zona [red zone] 
March 12, 2010) he was warning about have already taken place. The 2008 August War 
between Georgia and Russia is one of the prominent examples of the dramatic results of 
ongoing militarism as the integral part of war machine activity. Also, there will be more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Unfortunately, Merab Mamardashvili was perceived as antinational and anti-Georgian, and at some point 
was even ostracized from the Georgian community. That ostracization was in large part driven by his 
words: “truth stands beyond the native land” (Tsiteli Zona [red zone] March 12, 2010. My translation of 
Mamardashvili’s speech that was broadcast in the retrospective TV show, “Red Zone”).  In the early 90s, 
when Mamardashvili made that statement, even a slight downplaying of one’s native land was perceived 
oversensitively, because at that time, there was an urgent need for defending Georgia’s newly independent 
fragile state, which was then plagued with problems of territorial integrity and extreme nationalism. 
10 My translation of Mamardashvili’s speech that was broadcast in the retrospective TV show “Red Zone.” 
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dramatic results in other parts of the South Caucasus because “militarism creates 
problems it claims only militarism can solve, but its solutions are only so many more 
problems that, too, seem insoluble except to militarism” (Buchanan as cited in Buchanan 
& Parr, 2006, p. 22).   
Media is another part of war machines, which helps militarism to better permeate 
lay populations through its homogeneous, one-sided coverage. The forthcoming section 
will examine the ways in which the media represents itself as a micromechanism of the 
war machines. 
 
Homogeneity of Traditional Media 
Even a cursory look at media production and its public perception in the South 
Caucasus allows those distanced from the scene to see that the vast majority of the lay 
population, including civil society leaders and governmental decision makers, are 
gatekept by mainstream media.  This kind of reporting that some would even call “war 
journalism” (Webel et al., 2007, p. 258) exercises the framing of events one-sidedly and 
prejudicially, without implying that such mediation unwittingly transforms the public into 
war supporters (Akhvlediani, 2009).  
Perhaps the very variety of cultures, languages, and traditions is the main cause of 
“war journalism” and endless belligerence in the South Caucasus. There are more than 
100 nationalities in Georgia and about 10 ethnic groups including Armenians, Azris, 
Russians, Ossetians, Abkhazians, Kurds, Greeks, Kists, Yezids, and Ukrainians. People 
of minority ethnic groups make up 34% of Georgia’s population and are constantly 
objects of various prejudices and stereotypes that lead to belligerent discourses 
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(Rekhviashvili, 2010). The discourses of otherness are being permanently reproduced by 
the mainstream media and are tied to the problem of current and potential breakaway 
territories (Tsuladze, 2010).  In an article “What threats are being posed for Georgia in 
‘EU charter on Languages,’” the authors review the abundance of scarcities in regard to 
proclamations of some of the local languages, Megrelian, Abkhaz, and Svan as regional 
or national languages. Tsuladze (2010) points to the fear among the Georgian population 
and the country’s government that if languages of ethnic minorities would be 
empowered, it would give rise to new secession tendencies which will further weaken the 
nation state. The mainstream media’s government control and over all possible 
independence may be partially to blame, as main TV stations in Georgia are owned by 
ex-government officials and their close friends who are still largely associated with the 
ruling party and the President of Georgia.  The same could be said about the mainstream 
media in Armenia and Azerbaijan. According to Freedom House (2011), “Despite 
constitutional and legal protections, press freedoms are restricted and the media 
environment in Armenia remains oppressive and has not improved since the flawed 2008 
presidential election” (para. 1). Mainstream broadcast media is still heavily controlled by 
the government in Azerbaijan as well (BBC, 23 December 2011).   
Overall, the South Caucasus region represents one of the examples of how  
“media and official news services are only there to maintain the illusion of actuality, of 
the reality of the stakes, of the objectivity of the facts” (Baudrillard, 1994, p. 38, as cited 
in Buchanan & Parr, 2006). I agree with the idea of Meg Spratt that “news media don’t 
simply transmit factual information, but also shape cultural myth—or the stories we tell 
to define our histories, our values, and our beliefs” (Spratt, 2008, p. 87) — this, 
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especially, is one of the reasons why the same story archetypes are applied repeatedly to 
new events in Georgia. These archetypes are not hard to notice in news about Russia, the 
breakaway territories, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summits, where 
the archetype of an evil country is applied to Russia. No matter the subject of the news 
story, the breakaway territories are introduced as measurable marionette secessionists and 
NATO officials as potential defenders and rescuers of Georgia from a “limbo land” 
where, thanks to Russia and the breakaway territories, it is bound. Often reinforced and 
reproduced in the actual and virtual statements of the nation-state leaders, those 
archetypes crash into similarly one-sided claims of the other state or nonstate actors.  
However, even if the media were completely independent, I believe that for 
progressive thinking to take place, there is a need for journalists to step out from their 
ethnic frames and remove their experience from their stories, especially in such multi-
ethnic communities as the Caucasus, where stereotypes and prejudices play a major role 
in constructing everyday “reality.”  
This dichotomy of conflicting narratives could be traced back to pre-Soviet times, 
when there was no internet or television and it took much longer for a political statement 
or illusory, propagandistic news story to spread. However, finding the historic roots in 
this case does not provide the ultimate cure for these phenomena, which have become 







Soft Power Against Media Activism in 
the Caucasian Nation-States 
As Deleuze says, “we’re moving toward control societies that no longer operate 
by confining people but through continuous control and instant communication” (1995, 
174). There is a similar idea in Badiou’s (2003) philosophy, where he talks about the 
danger of the speed with which our world is marked: “the speed of historical change; the 
speed of technical change; the speed of communications; of transmissions; and even the 
speed with which humans beings establish connections with one another… It is because 
things, images and relations circulate so quickly that we do not even have time to 
measure the extent of this incoherency” (Badiou, 2003, p. 51). When contemplating the 
same idea of speed in the Caucasus, there is even more danger of incoherency, because 
there are more actors submitted to the propaganda of the war machines. However, the 
more communication develops, along with the creation of new tools and microschemes 
for spreading rigid, self-righteous thinking, it also provides opportunities for rhizomatic 
activism and deactivation of the war machines. The constructive dynamics in regards to 
war machine deactivation could be seen in the online “power shift” from nation-state to 
nonstate nomadic actors. The next subsections will elaborate on the issues of Information 
and Communication Technologies (ICTs) development, soft interferences from the 
nation-state, and its partial transformation into an ideological battlefield instead of a war 






Development of ICTs and the "Power Shift" 
in the Caucasus 
This subsection illustrates how the development of ICTs and, in particular, the 
emergence of new media is shifting power in the nation-state of Georgia, how the 
government is finding ways to adapt to this power shift, and how this process of 
"adaptation" may affect or is already affecting the impartiality and even-handedness of 
new media activists in the country. For the most part, the analysis of the nation-state in 
relation with international communication has been guided by topics of "liberation 
technology" or "technology of control," such as filtering and censorship (Diamond, 2010; 
Villeneuve, 2008; Zittrain & Palfrey, 2008). From this perspective, it is unlikely that a 
nation-state’s use of soft power could ever be equal or superior to the above-mentioned 
discursive topics for blocking freedom of expression, and thereby enacting public protest 
or democratic deliberation.  
The development ICTs have added new alternatives to broadcast media for 
politics, where dominant cultures and subcultures are able to promote their own agendas 
and interests; as vast numbers of scholars suggest, this trend will persist and even 
increase into the foreseeable future (Kellner, 2004; Mathews, 1997; Rheingold, 2002). 
Georgia is clearly a player in the global picture of this digital "contested terrain" (Kellner, 
2004). 
The popularity of new media was slowly rising in Georgia before August 2008, 
but intensified during the 2008 war with Russian over South Ossetia and currently 
continues to be so (Kosmo Show Interview with Georgian Bloggers, (Dodie Kharkheli, 
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Mariam Talakhadze and Giga Paichadze, November 10, 2009). Here are several reasons 
for the popularity of new media in Georgia and South Caucasus: 
• TV channels, which were at that time and still are the main sources of information for 
the Georgian population, where providing one-sided coverage of the war developments 
(Akhvlediani, 2009); thus, electronic media became more popular.  
• Due to the politically tense situation, more people started blogging to share their 
feelings and opinions with the online community.  
• As certain governmental agencies’ websites were blocked, officials also started to 
spread official information via blogs.  
The popularity of the blogosphere and social networks continued to rise even after 
the war crisis subsided. The fact that the new media in Georgia is enjoying unusual 
attention could be verified by numerous events dedicated to its present and future 
activists. Here is the list for major new media-related events for the past period: 
• On October 29-31, 2010, training in New/Social Media for journalists and citizen 
journalists was held in the biggest cities of Georgia, Tbilisi, Kutaisi, and Batumi, by 
Transitions Online, during which new media strategies and tools were discussed.  
• On June 30, 2010, the first Social Media Day was marked in Georgia. Bloggers and 
social media workers gathered in Mtatsminda Park in Tbilisi and gave presentations on 
the introduction of chat, different types of social media, RSS functions, and corporate 
blogs. 
• On June 24-26 2010, under the initiative of the Ministry of Economy of Georgia and 
with the financial support of Ltd Georgian Air Navigation, the Days of Georgian 
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Blogging were held in Kvariati, Black Sea. (I will elaborate more on this event in the next 
section.)  
• On June 20, 2010, AIESEC11 Georgia held a Media Conference at Tbilisi Free 
University, which included talks about social media along with traditional media.  
• On April 8 - 10, 2010, first Social Innovation Camp in Caucasus12 gathered 40 
participants, including designers, entrepreneurs, social needs experts, marketing, legal, 
and advertising gurus, from Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia.  
• On April 9 - 10, 2010, the "Social Media for Social Change13" conference was held in 
Tbilisi.  
• On October 12, 2009, with the financial support and arrangement of the Open Society 
Georgia Foundation, the New Media Forum was held and attended by 200 acting, 
beginner, or student journalists and NGO representatives.  
• On October 12, 2009, within the framework of the Georgian new media forum, the first 
Georgian blog catalogue www.blogroll.ge was presented, which provides its visitors with 
the list of Georgian blogs, rankings, statistics, and information about the Georgian 
blogosphere.  
• On June 7, 2008, about 150 people attended the Bar Camp Caucasus14 in Tbilisi.  
Besides ongoing activities and new media-related events, there are also cases of 
blogs and social networks influencing mainstream media and even political 
developments. Bijan Kafi (2010) describes one of the strongest cases on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 AIESEC, international student organization, an international platform that enables young people to explore and develop their 






OpenDemocracy.net. This is a story of 25-year old Sian Davies, then a charity worker in 
Georgia from Wales, who witnessed the 2008 war: 
 After commenting on a BBC website and on her blog that, contrary to CNN 
reports, Tbilisi had in fact not been bombed, international media picked up on the 
fact that she seemed to be one of the few reliable sources in an unusual information 
vacuum. Within 60 hours the media that had picked up her reports up from her blog 
had forwarded the stories to other stations and news agencies. These in turn were 
copied by others. (Para. 7, Kafi, 2010) 
 
Worth noting is that when the war started out, it was summer holiday season when 
most embassies close and many major TV and radio stations have no reporters on the 
ground. Thus, the information provided by Davies in 2008, which she herself gained from 
friends and friends of friends, reached the global public via new media. Nonetheless, the 
relevance of such citizen journalism still quickly diminished with the arrival of traditional 
media reporter, although many activists like Davis continued to reach out via mobile 
phones, Facebook, and various blogging platforms.  
 There are a number of Georgian social movements on Facebook still, one of 
which took place in spring 2010 and was one of the most interesting antigovernmental 
critiques in Georgia. It was caused by broadcasting the fake news on one of the leading 
national TV channels, Imedi, stating that a new war with Russia had started. That 
evening, thousands of people logged onto Facebook to find out what had happened in 
reality. After discovering the fact that news about the assassination of President 
Saakashvili and Georgian invasion by Russia was fake, innumerable Facebook users 
uploaded a crossed-out logo of the Imedi channel as their profile pictures, created 
antiImedi channel pages, and continued to have debates over the level of governmental 
control on TV stations in Georgia. To trace the concrete outcomes of this event would 
require further research, but the fact that dissemination of fake news was protested by a 
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major part of the population that was most vividly seen on web once again proves the 
strong potential of new media in Georgia.  
Another example of blogging being important is the numerous attacks on one of 
the Georgian bloggers. The Guardian has covered one of the most active series of attacks 
on http://cyxymu.livejournal.com/, who writes pro-Georgian posts mostly on Georgian-
Abkhaz and Georgian-Russian conflicts. His social network accounts on LiveJournal, 
Facebook, and Twitter were attacked on August 7, 2009 on the anniversary of the 
Georgian-Russian 2008 war. The Guardian reports that:  
The strikes appeared to be one of the most widespread and coordinated attacks ever 
seen online, shutting down Twitter for significant portions of Thursday, as well as 
causing serious problems for Facebook and blogging service LiveJournal. Google, 
too, was subjected to attacks but said it had been able to prevent any damage - 
although some users reported some unexpected problems with the Internet giant's 
services. (guardian.co.uk, Friday 7 August 2009) 
 
As reported by The Guardian, these attacks could be evidence of a grudge or personal 
vendetta rather than an organized criminal act aimed at blackmailing major websites. 
However, some Georgian bloggers see the traces of Russian government action, or, as 
Ronald Deibert and Rafal Rohoznski (2010) would say, "patriotic hacking":  
…individuals can take creative actions—sometimes against perceived threats to 
their country's national interest—that have systemwide effects. ...Those individuals 
who possess the necessary technical skills have at times taken it upon themselves to 
attack adversarial sources of information, often leaving provocative messages and 
warnings behind. ...Some government security services informally encourage or 
tacitly approve of the actions of patriotic groups. 
 
In the case of http://cyxymu.livejournal.com/, it is still undetermined whether the 
attacks were the work of the Russian government, their citizens, or a combination of the 
two. Some skeptics might assert that this attack was a coincidence, a system glitch, that 
no blogger could be worthy of such large-scale hacking. However, I would argue that 
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such intensive attacks simultaneously on several accounts of the blogger could not be a 
coincidence, and those facts of interference in the blogosphere once again prove that 
some actors were affected by the single blogger. Otherwise, why would someone have to 
put so much effort into disrupting someone’s social network account or blog? Many are 
asking this question in Georgia and are thrilled by the popularity of 
http://cyxymu.livejournal.com/, and there is no surprise among these Georgians that new 
media activists wish to take this person down.  
As reported by Blogroll.ge,15 on average, 141 posts are being created per day by 
818 bloggers in the country. There is a wide variety of bloggers and social network 
activists in Georgia. Some of them are "just for fun bloggers" as they call themselves: 
others pursue a goal of establishing certain networks and engage in joint initiatives and 
discussions. There are also a number of corporations, governmental agencies and 
traditional media blogs and social network profiles. There has not been systemic study of 
blog segments in Georgia; however, a strong parallel-study could be drawn with the 
results of Technorati's 2010 report on the state of the blogosphere. 
The statistics support the optimists’ views, which consider new media as being a 
”liberation technology.” In Georgia, like worldwide, hobbyists could be seen as the 
majority of bloggers; in Georgia, similar rates of bloggers exist of part-time and corporate 
bloggers. However, making arguments on the rate of self-employed bloggers is much 
harder, as bloggers themselves do not report their income from the Internet, nor does any 
organization.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 www.blogroll.ge is agregator of the Georgian blogosphere as it calls itself was created in October 2009 
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  However, the idea of Internet marketing and self-specialization in the blogosphere 
is rather popular in Georgia. According to blogger Lishtota, in Shota Khinchagashivili's16 
opinion it may be profitable for some new media activists to get involved in product 
advertising for business companies; financially less attractive topics such as election 
processes and media criticism are less motivating to write on. "Georgian bloggers, who 
are represented by the overwhelming majority of young people, are not interested in 
political processes of the country and are the least probable to make political comments if 
there is not a special mini-grant or contest announced" (Khinchagashvili, S. 2010).  
Therefore, it is less likely to expect any strong political criticism in this new media 
populated primarily by disinterested youth. 
However, as Richard Kahn and Douglas Kellner (2004) argue, "the success of 
blogging should not be judged solely on whether it generates obvious political effects" 
(pp. 92-93). Ethan Zuckerman (2010) notes in an interview with suprisinglyfree.com, 
even nonpolitical bloggers may turn political when cases of major injustice occur. 
Besides politics, there are other sensitive themes, like breakaway regions and ethnic, 
religious, and sexual minorities, which are not treated with much tolerance in Georgia. 
Ongoing discussions though new media could also foster processes of reconciliation and 
tolerance.  
New Media Support projects are also emerging among NGOs operating in 
Georgia and are helping new bloggers to find better and easier ways for citizen reporting. 
Among those are the Open Society Georgia Foundation (OSGF), United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP), Embassy of United States of America in Tbilisi, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 personal correspondence with Shota Khinchagashivili a blogger and Ph. D. student of Ilia University in Tbilisi, Georgia. His blog 
can be found at http://lishtota.blogspot.com/  
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European Commission. Newly emerged local NGOs like GO Group Media, Singular 
Group, and well-established NGOs like Internews Georgia have also started 
implementation of new media related projects. Even the most popular TV channels’ 
shows and programs are incorporating new media elements like Facebook, Twitter 
accounts, blogs, and forums.  
On the other hand, it also should be noted that regardless of a significant 
resonance with its emergence and popularization, ICTs cannot be a replacement for other 
forms of interaction and communication, but only a powerful supplement (Danitz & 
Strobel, 2002). However, the need for such a supplement in a country where the whole 
TV media is polarized—leading national TV channels have an apparent pro-ruling party 
stance while small TV stations in the capital gear towards extremely oppositional 
posture—the need for alternative insight is rising. The emerging and developing 
blogosphere and social networks have already started to satisfy a rising demand for 
neutral credible information sources.  
To go back to the initial purpose of this paper, I will now explicate how the 
Georgian government is adapting to this new “power shift” caused by the emergence of 
ICTs and how it is exerting “soft power” in doing so.  
 
Adaptation of the Nation-States with 
the New “Power Shift” 
Pessimists’ arguments that Web 2.0 is equally accessible for nefarious purposes 
proves to be true in Georgian case as well. The fact that the nation-state is affected by the 
existence of Web 2.0 could be well concluded from its active involvement in new media. 
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Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili alone has three personal accounts and four public 
figure pages with hundreds of friends and fans. Similar stats could be observed in other 
ruling party leaders, with similar pages being created by opposition figures.  
One of the most interesting periods for observing governmental behavior on the 
web was the election of the Tbilisi mayor in May 2010, when the page in support of the 
ruling party candidate Gigi Ugulava was created on Facebook. The most interesting thing 
about this was that the fans’ accounts had been created less than 1 month before and most 
of them had no activity except being a fan of Gigi Ugulava. Such faking of a grass-roots 
movement is the perfect illustration of what Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane (1998) call 
the use of free information, i.e., “information that actors are willing to create and 
distribute without financial compensation. The sender benefits from the receiver 
believing the information and hence has incentives to produce it. Motives may vary. 
Scientific information is a public good but persuasive messages, such as political ones, 
are more self-serving” (p.85).  Therefore, use of social networks for political purposes 
could also be considered exertion of soft power through use of “free information” (Nye et 
al., 1998). 
Some other instances of astroturfing are touched on in a blog by Radio Liberty 
journalist, Ia  (2009, November 20). She concretely talks about ideological supporters of 
the ruling party, one of leaders of the Liberty Institute NGO, and an established pundit in 
the country. Ramishvili makes several posts per day and has more than 4,000 friends on 
Facebook, part of whom actively comment on his statuses and posts. As Antadze says in 
her blog, although “the Facebook club” is in the public space, the decisions discussed on 
there are taken behind closed doors, but the public has no trouble accepting those. For 
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that, she calls Georgians’ activity on Facebook a club, which in her opinion, seems to be 
guided by liberal values and, more specifically, the protection of society from religious 
fundamentalism or the religious autocracy.  However, the group is, in fact, characterized 
by overarching loyalty towards the government and especially one of the governmental 
groups: “Thus all the issues discussed in this club are being viewed through the lens of 
this group” (Antadze, 2009, November 1, para. 5). However, Levan Ramishvili is not the 
only politically active person on social networks and the blogosphere, as there are many 
more. It would be relevant here to draw a parallel with what Evgeny Morozov (2010) 
talks about on SuprisinglyFree.com. He describes similar types of activities in Russia and 
China, where designated web-active people attempt to destroy communities by making 
innumerable posts and “leaving so many comments that any kind of rational debate 
becomes impossible.” Such activities online narrow the public sphere, thus decreasing the 
democratization potential of “liberation technology.”  
   If we follow Joseph Nye’s and Robert Keohane’s (1998) arguments, by indirect 
influence, government tries to gain credibility over their ideologies if those become 
transmitted by bloggers. Hence, as Nye et al. claim: 
It [soft power] depends largely on the persuasiveness of the free information that 
an actor seeks to transmit. If a state can make its power legitimate in the eyes of 
others and establish international institutions that encourage others to define their 
interests in compatible ways, it may not need to expend as many costly traditional 
economic or military resources. (Nye & Keohane, 1998, p. 86) 
 
  The potential of online activists in gaining “persuasiveness of the free 
information” has not been underestimated by government, which could be concluded 
from its attempts to establish a close relationship with them. One of the most visible 
examples of government trying to interfere in new media would be Georgian Blogging 
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Days organized by the Ministry of Economy of Georgia, with financial support of Ltd. 
Georgian Air Navigation on June 24-26, 2010 in Kvariati, a popular Georgian Black Sea 
resort. The seminar covered the following topics: creation of an electronic manual for the 
beginner bloggers; marketing and branding strategies for private companies; organizing 
an action to promote Batumi (capital of autonomous region of Georgian Ajara, mostly 
popular for its seaside resorts) through blogging and collecting relevant material; 
elaboration of recommendations for the authorities to activate actions in new media 
(GOV 2.0); etc. 
It could be concluded that the Communications, Information Technology, and 
Innovation Department of the Ministry of Economic Development of Georgia, which 
organized this meeting of bloggers, does a good job, as it is trying to promote information 
technology advances, so that the country catches up with the modern global world; 
however, as blogger Lishtota [Shota Khinchagashvili] (2010) asserts, “indirect political 
influence could be observed there as well” (personal communication with Shota 
Khichagashvili). As the blogosphere is independent of civil media, any of its cooperation 
with state structures could be dangerous for the freedom of expression.  Especially in a 
country where much of traditional media is monopolized, civic journalism remains one of 
the rare credible information sources, though in the case of cooperation with government, 
the whole notion of credibility would be destroyed. Thus, the only way to do a good job 
for new media is not to interfere in it all.  As blogger Lishtota believes, Georgian 
government has anticipated the actuality of new media in Georgia and the potential shift 
of power relations. Thus, meeting bloggers in the wake of political criticism should be 
considered as an affective means of adaptation brought by ICTs. 
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However, there is a huge debate on governmental involvement in that sphere even 
among bloggers. Journalist and blogger Tazo Kupreishvili claims that even if Georgian 
authorities bribed 30 bloggers, there are around 700 active bloggers remaining in 
Georgia. “And if so-called ‘bribed’ bloggers would decide to protest, they would not face 
any difficulty creating anonymous blogs, and express their ideas this way.  So, there is no 
way Georgian government can have control over new media activists in the country” 
(Kupreishvili, 2010, para. 7). 
However, soon after the state-funded meeting of Georgian bloggers at one of the 
best seaside resorts of Georgia, a scandalously titled article "На Черном море вербуют 
блоггеров" (bloggers won over at the Black Sea) appeared in a trilingual online edition 
of The Georgia Times. The article, with a noticeable pro-Russian stance, harshly 
criticized the event, saying, “Young people are generously wined and dined and taught 
how to fight on the media front” (Bolotnikova, 2010, para. 1). Despite the ultimately pro-
Russian sentiment in her article, Svetlana Blotnikova points out some important points 
that have not been favored in the attention of the Georgian media, such as the fact that 
part of the meeting was led by famous pro-Georgian and anti-Russian bloggers Georgi 
Jakhaya, blogging on the above-mentioned suhumu.livejournal.com, and Oleg Panfilov, 
both of whom dedicated their reports to the role of social media in the protection of state 
interests. 
 As blogger Lishtota [Shota Khinchagashvili] says, unfortunately, in Georgia, 
producing low-grade Internet productions and thus involving anti-Russian information 
campaigns is a more fashionable trend than providing critical analysis of actions of those 
who are in power inside the country. However, with the recent war with Russia and the 
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political ideological campaign driven constantly by the ruling party that Georgia should 
be united against “one evil adversary” – Russia, hinders independent thinking. Another 
point is that those who are guided by the blogs are largely young journalists or students 
and they naturally have the desire for self-actualization. As Davit Mchedlidze of the 
Internews Georgia mentions, “the best way to gain attention is to do that via blogging. 
Then, the most active and creative ones are being monitored and invited by government” 
(personal communication). Therefore, it is not only the government being “nefarious” as 
Joseph Nye et al. call it, but there is also a weakness of new media activists who are 
relatively easy to win over. 
The fact that the Georgian government is trying to adapt with the emergence of 
new technologies is evident, though it is not clear if bloggers are willing to resist and to 
what extent the content of their work changed since the government activated its “pro-
blogger” policy. Further research of soft governmental interferences into the blogosphere 
would be effective from the viewpoint of the development of independent rhizomatic 
media activism. The fact remains that progovernmental and antipolitical opponents’ 
statements are abundant in cyberspace. The traditional one-sidedness of Georgian 
journalism in broadcast or print media can be opposed online, a place where pro-
Georgian ideas are juxtaposed with anti-Georgian claims. Such a multiplicity of 
conflicting statements online transforms cyberspace into an ideological battlefield, which 






“Liberation Technology” as an 
Ideological Battlefield 
This subsection will elaborate on the Georgian-Russian “war of videos” on 
www.YouTube.com (hereafter YouTube) as an illustration of the war machines’ affect on 
the war-divided communities. This particular analysis of the “war of videos,” which 
occurred on YouTube following the 2008 war between Georgia and Russia, will show 
how the dominant ideologies of both countries have been re-appropriated in this new 
media and how those discourses thereby gained radical character in this rhetorical 
battlefield. Particularly, the goal of the subsection is to examine how these dominant 
ideologies are re-articulating and disarticulating socially constructed realities of each side 
through offensive, insinuating, and belligerent discourses.  
Being anonymous creators, free of any moral and professional responsibilities, the 
authors of these videos demonstrate the purest national hatred and thereby bring to light 
the extreme ideologies that usually are being veiled in traditional media. The dominant 
cultural, social, and political one-sided meanings of public discourse are being re-
articulated and disarticulated in similar manners by both Georgians and Russians. 
 
Analysis of the videos 
In all analyzed videos, I found re-articulation and disarticulation of each other’s 
ideas and representations of socio-political actors. On the basis of results, I then defined 
seven distinctive discourses for each of the sides that justify and legitimate Georgian and 
Russian nationalism, which are presented and discussed in two sections below. Most of 
the discourses leave out claims made on the other side of the conflict and, thereby, 
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vividly illustrate irrational, one-sided discourses and the need for reconciliation.  
 
Anti-Russian videos 
 1) Russia the “Goliath,” Georgia “David” discourse: Russia is an authoritarian 
bloody state that caused large-scale destruction and human suffering in Georgia and 
should be punished. The war has been between disproportionate powers, with the 
significant military domination from the Russian side; the 2008 war and further isolation 
of Russia from the West; Georgia—a small but democratically evolving country in acute 
need of the West, were successfully brought up by all acting agents for disarticulation 
and re-articlation of Kremlin’s ideologies, starting from Georgian mainstream media 
(Akhvlediani, 2009; Heinrich & Tanaev, 2009) and ending with new media including 
UT. Pro-Georgian YouTube users articulate Russia as invader and ask the international 
community for help; thereby, most of the text that appears in the videos is in English. For 
example, nanaka77 (2008) says in her video: “SOS!!! Small Caucasus republic of 
Georgia is in a state of war with dangerous enemy Russia. Russians killed thousands of 
civilians. They are terrorists and must be punished. Support freedom of Georgia! We 
need to say no to Russia and stop them” nanaka77 (2008). The text is written in red color, 
similar to the burning houses and bleeding people shown in the background. This video is 
accompanied by a sad Georgian song about the war and further shows refugees in shelters 
and protest demonstrations with tabloids against Russia and particularly Russian Prime 
Minister Vladimir Putin. “Putin Killer”—says one of the tabloids in demonstration 
pictures. “Russia is attacking innocent people. Shame on Russia! Long live free 
Georgia!”—the nationalistic text continues to be accompanied with more pictures of 
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mass destruction of Georgia, human casualties, and protests against Russia. The second 
half of this video is more optimistic and has a belligerent nationalistic stance and will be 
discussed further with regard to self-defense. All those above-mentioned components of 
nanaka77’s (2008) video are present in other pro-Georgian videos and come as 
“ideological elements” (Hall, 1986) that are aimed at disarticulating the Russian 
discourse of “Georgia the ‘Goliath,’ South Ossetia ‘David,’” thereby drawing a picture of 
Russia that is isolated from the civilized world with its belligerent actions—like 
“Goliath” as a gigantic freak of nature isolated from humankind.  
2) Anti-Russian President discourse: The Russian president is the marionette of a 
crazy, bloody, “soviet” prime minister. Videos that come directly under this discourse are 
purposefully aimed at re-articulating key political figures from the conflicting country. 
Particularly, videos intended to distort Medviedev’s and Putin’s reputation use some 
offensive elements that traditional media dare not use, though sometimes alluding to 
them. For example, BexoDzia (2008) uses Vladimir Visotsky’s popular Russian song 
about romantic remembrances of a man’s youthful years, starts with the smiling, 
innocent-looking picture of teenage Putin and then adds some awkward cadres and 
picture montages of Putin in a convict’s uniform, and pictures of bloody hands and guns, 
thus trying to show how the young boy was spoiled and turned into a tyrant. Framing 
Russia’s main political figure so negatively strengthens this “us-versus-them” 
distinction—we have a tall handsome democratic leader; they have a short, gloomy 
tyrant.  
One of the most interesting features of this video is the picture manipulations 
aimed at the re-articulating and distorting of Russian leadership’s key figures, as is done 
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with the theme of “Medvedev, Putin’s marionette.” Medvedev and Putin’s pictures are 
here juxtaposed on the Madonna and infant Jesus, and on Dr. Evil and “mini” Dr. Evil.    
However, online activists were not the first to articulate the Russian president as a 
“marionette” of Vladimir Putin; the Georgian mainstream media has often depicted these 
kinds of power relations within Russian political leadership (Kavkasiuri Dgiuri, 2009). 
Thereby, nationalism on YouTube is once again a reflection of ideas spread by the 
mainstream media and it indicates the need for more responsible and cross-country 
cooperative journalism. Work of journalists from all the conflicting sides on two or multi-
sided reports or participating in multisided trainings and conferences would help 
overcome extreme one-sidedness, which is yet prevailing. 
3) Nazi Russia discourse: Parallels drawn between Putin and Hitler. Most of the 
negative rhetoric is geared not toward Medvedev but the heavier political figure—
Vladimir Putin. This phenomenon could be easily noticed in anti-Russian videos that are 
more focused on re-articulating the persona of Putin. For instance, fuckrussia3 (2008), 
one of the most active YouTubers aimed at creating associations between Putin and 
Adolf Hitler, shows manipulated pictures of the Russian prime minister with a Hitler 
mustache.  
As Hall (1986) says, there is a “non-necessary link” between constituents of an 
ideology; i.e., in case of antiRussian videos this “non-necessary link” is between German 
Nazism and Russian policy, between Putin and Hitler. However, in order to further 
strengthen Georgia’s “David” position fighting against evil “Goliath” Russia’s 
associations with “evil” (Ivie, 2007), components are being created. Specifically, the 
Soviet Union symbols that surround Russia and its political leadership in fuckrussia3’s 
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(2008) and other related videos are being used as representations of “an evil empire” and 
Nazi symbols meanwhile strive towards creating the link between “the dark memory of 
Adolf Hitler” as “the personification of archetypal evil” (Ivie, 2007, p. 223) and Russia 
today, thereby rearticulating its self-righteous ideology.  
4) De-facto authorities of Georgian breakaway territories are Russian 
marionettes; thereby they constitute the same “evil” as Russia. This discourse took root 
during the early 1990s when the conflicts with breakaway territories started. Georgian 
authorities blamed Russia for turning “Caucasian brothers” against each other (De Waal, 
2010) via aligning with the “criminal” de-facto authorities of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, thus forming alliances against peaceful civilians and the Georgian government. 
This myth is still present in Georgian political statements, media coverage, and what is 
more significant, in popular Georgian music clips (Jashi, S., October 1, 2010, personal 
communication). Therefore, it is no surprise that YouTube users appropriate the 
discourse of “Georgian breakaway territories” about de-facto authorities being Russian 
marionettes. “When we expressed desire to be independent they [Russians] incited 
against us from one side Kokoiti [South Ossetian de-facto president Eduard Kokoiti] 
from another Bagapshi [Abkhazian de-facto president Sergey Bagapsh],” says singing 
amiko1815 (2009) and shows the Russian army with a dog, which has South Ossetian de-
facto president Eduard Kokoiti’s face. This small detail aims at justifying Georgia’s 
battle against South Ossetia.  
5) Self-defense, pro-war discourse: Georgia has strong and brave soldiers. In 
order to justify war, Georgia promoted a discourse of self-defense against the “Goliath” 
Russia. Most of the anti-Russian videos feature “brave” Georgian solders, who were 
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defending their land and therefore are “heroes.” For example, nanaka77 (2008) starts her 
video showing the Russian invasion and Georgian victims of the war, but in the end turns 
to the theme of “bravery” of Georgian solders. In her video, a Georgian rap song 
accompanies photos of anti-Russian rallies and the Georgian army, saying: “They 
[Georgian solders] have sacrificed their lives for the native land. So, we all have to stand 
together to defend freedom of our country…” Then, the rhetoric of the video and song 
becomes more belligerent as it shows aggressive protestors with their fists, saying, “We 
should show our power to the enemy…” nanaka77 (2008).   
 Other YouTube activists like BangRonZA	  (2008)	  have focused their videos 
entirely on cadres of Georgian army fighting accompanied by rock music, thereby re-
articulating what pro-Russian online activists frame as the weak and defeated Georgian 
army. Despite the fact that almost 4 years have passed since the end of the 2008 war, pro-
war Georgian videos featuring “brave solders that are defending their country” still 
continue to be uploaded onto YouTube (Paskunji, 2010; ALEMAN523, 2010), thereby 
trying to re-articulate the idea that Georgia cannot defend its land. The “strong Georgian 
army” is also a leitmotif on the leading Georgian TV channel; thus, it is no surprise that 
new pro-war videos in Georgia continue to be created and naturlize the idea that Georgia 
must one day have war with Russia again. 
6) Derogatory Russian army discourse: Poor alcoholic soldiers of Russia. To 
strengthen the idea of a powerful Georgian army capable of defeating the “enemy,” 
YouTubers aim at disarticulation of the “powerful Russian army.” At least one-fourth of 
the videos portray Russian soldiers in a derogatory manner, arguing they are incapable of 
fighting. George19947 (2010) shows cadres of Russian soldiers stealing from a shop in 
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the town of Gori. RadikalGeorgia (2009) shows the footage, apparently shot by a Russian 
soldier himself, where he walks in the ruins and emotionally tells how the Georgian army 
caused huge losses to the Russian army, how much better conditions are in the Georgian 
army, and how poor the Russian soldiers are themselves. Amiko1815 (2009) shows 
pictures of a drunken Russian solder with a bottle of vodka and of Russian solders kissing 
each other and stealing things.  
Amiko1815 (2009) is trying to make these elements symbols of a weak Russian 
army, as such claims make it easier for a small country like Georgia to think about 
effectively fighting against them. The Georgian song about “Vania” [this is what most 
Georgians casually refer to Russians] that accompanies the pictures, says: “Totally drunk 
Vania with his tank is coming to invade us. He has stolen anything what he could take 
and now he is leaving” (Amiko1815, 2009). By putting these different pieces of “Russian 
army character,” pro-Georgian Youtubers are trying to disarticulate the idea of a “strong 
Russian army” and, thereby, are pointing at its weakness, which is similar to what is 
being usually broadcasted by mainstream Georgian media in a more subtle way. Sandro 
Kakabadze (2008), a correspondent for the popular Georgian TV channel Rustavi2, says 
in his footage, “what they did not manage to steal, they [Russian soldiers] are exploding,” 
(Sandro Kakabadze, 2008) and at the same time indicates the poor conditions of Russian 
military technique.  Georgia thereby posits itself as better than Russia and capable of 
defeating them in a future war. 
7) International support, Kremlin destruction discourse: European countries and 
USA are supporting Georgia in its conflict against Russia; Russia does not like NATO, 
Russia/Kremlin soon will be destroyed as it leads itself to isolation. This discourse is one 
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of the best examples of the reflection of the dominant Georgian ideologies that are being 
constantly reproduced by traditional media; in particular, the idea of Western support for 
Georgia against “evil” (Ivie, 2007) Russia. It should be noted that this discourse did not 
just originate during the 2008 war, but was created during the “Rose Revolution,” and 
when George W. Bush visited Tbilisi (Veyser, 2010). amiko1815 (2009) shows a picture 
of George W. Bush holding President Saakashvili’s hand up (as a boxing judge usually 
holds the winner’s hand) during his welcome ceremony in Tbilisi and the text of the song 
reports that “The world—America and Euro-Asia—is standing on our side, which makes 
Duma [Russian Parliament] concerned [about its perspective]” (amiko1815, 2009). Then, 
the text plays with the word “NATO,” which in Georgian is a woman’s name, and goes 
onto say: “Russia cannot understand that our land is our land and that we prefer ‘Nato’ 
over Miss ‘Larisa’ [a Russian women’s name].” This discourse in comparison to other 
above-discussed discourses brings into the debate international elements like the EU, the 
United States, and the international community, and with this is trying to justify and 
strengthen its ideology of Russia as the “Goliath” and re-articulate “antiGeorgian-PR 
discourse,” which will be discussed in the anti-Georgian videos section.  
 Now, I will discuss how the Russian side is addressing disarticulation and re-
articulation of its ideas by Georgian UT users.  
 
Anti-Georgian videos 
1) Georgia the “Goliath,” South Ossetia “David” discourse: Georgia is an 
authoritarian, bloody state that caused large-scale destruction in South Ossetia. Videos 
analyzed under this discourse, as in anti-Russian videos, contain similar elements as 
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argued by the mainstream media and politicians in Russia: the 2008 August War started 
between disproportionate powers, with oversized military supremacy from the Georgian 
side; the small nation of South Ossetia needed help; and Georgia spreads propaganda 
favoring its version of the war. The above-mentioned elements clash with the pro-
Georgian discourse of “Russia the ‘Goliath,’ Georgia ‘David’” discourse’s elements and 
thus enable its disarticulation. For instance, iveter999 (2008) in his video tells how in the 
heat of the Beijing Olympic Games and summer, Georgia attacked peaceful South 
Ossetians. “There are many disputed territories around the world”—the author says in 
Russian with a strong South Ossetian accent—“but people discuss, argue and not kill 
each other over them… Life is more important than any kind of wealth, though not for 
coldblooded Saakashvili [president of Georgia]. He thought to defeat small South 
Ossetian nation quickly—to kill half and half would flee. However, it did not turn out as 
he planned” (iveter999, 2008). This kind of simple language mimics the supposed 
authenticity of an ordinary people’s views on war. As the text goes on, the cadres of the 
Georgian army moving towards South Ossetia are shown. Similarly to anti-Russian 
videos, here too, protest actions against Georgia are shown, with the tabloids “bloody 
Saakashvili,” pro-Russian users are trying to show that they represent not only their own 
view but the whole South Ossetian and Russian population, thereby making anti-
Georgian rhetoric sound more rational. To add more to this claim, maikle75 (2008) 
focuses more on South Ossetian victims of the 2008 war, showing an elderly woman’s 
interview, where she tells about the unexpected Georgian invasion and massive 
destruction of Tskhinval/i: “People were hiding in basements with their children, but 
[Georgian] militaries were still finding and killing them” (maikle75, 2008).  
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2) Georgians are hotheaded, crazy, and have a cowardly president who is the 
marionette of the United States. For further disarticulation of Georgian self-defense 
ideology, Russian “online warriors” focus on disarticulating of its primary components of 
Georgian ideology—President Mikheil Saakashvili’s figure. Disarticulating his ideas and 
actions seemed to be a crucial task for anti-Georgia web activists, as Saakashvili was the 
main advocate for articulating Georgia’s “David” position through international media 
during the 2008 war (Vaagan, 2009). putinist95 (2009) argues that “Saakashvili has killed 
thousand of civilians in South Ossetia and also destroyed his own country” (putinist95, 
2009). Then he shows a famous clip of Saakashvili chewing his tie while talking on the 
phone.  With the Abkhazian national anthem playing, the author says, “We have to 
support free South Ossetian people and not the mass murderer Saakashvili.” The 
“Saakashvili chewing his tie” theme is present in most of the analyzed videos, but some 
have dedicated whole videos to him in this act. Multpolitik (2009), for instance, has 
created a special cartoon, where president Saakashvili is drawn to have bad dreams of his 
red tie that bites him.  
Others focus on “Saakashvili the coward,” and show again widely circulated 
cadres of the Georgian president with an extremely frightened face, accompanied with 
guards falling to their knees when hearing Russian military air planes flying over 
(Iveter999, 2008; Tsesson, 2008). The message is clear—our president is better than 
yours, our country is better than yours, thereby strengthening the “us-versus-them” 
binary.  Espo3d (2008), like many other pro-Russian UT users, shows Saakashvili as a 
“puppet” of the U.S. president George W. Bush, arguing that Georgia started the war with 
South Ossetia with U.S. backing, equating Saakashvili and Bush as terrorists. This kind 
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of rhetoric is similar to its main source of inspiration—mainstream media—and leaves 
out factual information representing claims about territorial integrity and the Western 
orientation of the Georgian side. Such one-sidedness further polarizes the Georgian-
Russian perceptions of each other. 
3) Nazi Georgia discourse: Parallels drawn between Saakashvili and Hitler. 
YouTubers incorporate some Nazi components in drawing Saakashvili’s portrait as a 
“bloody tyrant”—the comparison was alluded to in many Russian and South Ossetian 
mainstream media even before the 2008 war (Gabaratiy, 2007). As with Russian videos, 
here too, Hitler-like-mustaches are drawn on President Saakashvili’s portraits and 
swastikas are placed on the Georgian flag and objects surrounding the president 
(MetallMensch, 2008; putinist95, 2009; Swordman85, 2009).  
Some (SpbGoro, 2008) went further and incorporated an audio of Adolf Hitler’s 
emotional speeches into the visual of President Saakashvili addressing the masses.  
Others like KaterinaArt (2008) use German hard rock accompanied with montage images 
of Saakashvili looking like Hitler. In between pictures of Saakashvili, images of war 
victims are shown, though unlike in other pro-Russian videos, here some Georgian 
refugees and injured people are present. Presumably, the author was trying to assure 
Georgia that they are victims of their own president’s actions. Particularly, this discourse 
illustrates how even one component added to a picture—in this case moustaches to 
Saakashvili’s portraits or audio of Hitler’s speech to the Georgian president’s visual—
may cause complete disarticulation of what is represented as reality by the other side.  
 4) Protective and punishing discourse: Russia was defending civilians in 
breakaway South Ossetia and therefore punished Georgia for its Nazi intentions. The 
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media and political sphere argued that Russia only reacted to an unprovoked attack on 
South Ossetia that caused hundreds of civilian deaths as well as those of many Russian 
peacekeepers. One example of is radio program Ekho Moskvi [Moscow’s echo] (2008), 
where former foreign deputy minister Aleksey Arbatov responds to the skeptical remark 
of the journalist about “why international mass media is making such a big deal out of 
this Georgia-South Ossetian conflict.” Here in this program, Arbatov paints Russian 
military involvement in Georgia as “undoubtedly needed and unavoidable” due to the 
need for small South Ossetia’s protection. Mainly, pro-Russian YouTubers do almost the 
same as Arbatov, though not via discussions, but with pictures and sounds. Tsesson 
(2008), for example, uses Soviet-era cartoons of Russia trying to punish and discipline 
naughty boy President Saakashvili. mger43 (2008) tells the story of the 2008 war in two 
sketches. The first shows a Georgian man beating a little bear [South Ossetia] and a big 
scary bear [Russia] that is watching the scene from a distance.  The second sketch shows 
a Georgian man severely beaten, calling for NATO, the EU, and the United States’ help, 
and the big and small bear walking away holding each others hands.  
Russiasila (2009) incorporates visuals from some military video game 
accompanied by rock music and writes the text on screen: “On 8th of August Georgian 
army perfidiously attacked South Ossetia, destroying everything on its way. Russia 
responded to the aggressors with the attack” (Russiasila, 2009). Other pro-Russian 
YouTubers re-articulate Georgian self-defense rhetoric into a Georgian invasion of small 
South Ossetia and with UT justifies Russian involvement in the war.  
 5) Pro-war discourse: Russia is a powerful state and has a strong army. This 
discourse correlates with the previous one in regards to effectiveness of Russian military 
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action to “coerce Georgia to peace” (Allison, 2008). stallz123 (2008) in his videos says: 
“maybe we are not good diplomats, but we are good soldiers—as we broke Georgia and 
protected Ossetians.” Like pro-Georgian UT users, pro-Russian online activists also bring 
up widely the theme of a strong Russian army. However, one of the YouTubers, 
RussiaTvSold (2009), instead of focusing on the fight against Georgia, writes in the 
descriptions of the video: “Coming to an end the era of U.S. hegemony over the world ... 
This Russian army, in 2014.” The video itself is accompanied with American rap and 
features colorful pictures of the Russian army.  
 6) Derogatory Georgian army discourse: Cowardly Georgian soldiers. In order to 
further strengthen the negative image of the Georgian side, pro-Russian YouTubers focus 
on showing a humiliated, defeated Georgian army. “Video for Georgia 2” by iveter999 
(2008) shows beaten Georgian solders, surrendered and shivering in fear. Some of them 
say that they did not know that they were going to the war. One of them says he was 
fighting only because he received a salary of 600 Georgian lari (approximately 300 
USD). Another video by sashkacom (2008) features cadres of Georgian captives standing 
against the wall and one of them saying that they ran away as soon as they found out why 
they were sent to South Ossetia. All those components (humiliation, defeat, cowardice, 
incapability of fighting) together dehumanize Georgian solders and try to disarticulate 
Georgia’s ideology of heroes that fight for their native land  
7) Anti-Georgian PR discourse: There is no way for Georgia to persuade the 
international community in its rightness, thereby it is isolating itself with its belligerent 
policy. After the 2008 Georgia-Russia war, many have indicated that even though Russia 
may have won the military battle, it lost the “PR war” (Gee, 2008; Rogers, 2008). 
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Therefore, pro-Russian YouTube users are trying to prove the international community 
does not value the Georgian narrative. However, in contrast to pro-Georgian videos, 
which mainly use the English language for such international messages, pro-Russian 
videos are mainly in Russian. For example, foreskin (2008) uses a melody from the 
soundtrack from the popular Soviet era comedy “Caucasian Captive Woman” and 
changes the words to: “Somewhere in the Caucasian mountains it started to freeze and 
Caucasian Misha got sick… He started to howl at the moon. Then he started to bark, so 
that everyone including himself turned blue… But nobody cares about his barking”. 
iveter999 (2008) in his video about how Georgia attacked South Ossetia says: “The 
whole world could see how Georgia took advantage of the politically inactive summer 
and Olympics time to regain by force small South Ossetia. How can the president of 
Georgia rely upon international support after the brutalities he had done to this small 
nation?!” The same discourse of anti-Georgian PR was appropriated by Russian 
mainstream media (Golos Rossii [Voice of Russia], 2010; Stringer, 2008). However, this 
discourse was more aimed at persuading a Russian audience than an international 
audience; unlike Georgia, Russia was mainly addressing Western communities. Thereby, 
with this discourse, the Russian side was trying to disarticulate the Georgian perspective. 
Such re-articulation of “Goliath” and “David” in Russian and Georgian media further 
contributed to strengthening the alienation between Georgians and Russians, but at the 
same time pointed to the need for reconciliation. 
Analysis of anti-Georgian and anti-Russian UT videos shows that technology is 
being used to irrationally spread propaganda and reproduce dominant ideology, which 
makes it a mere tool in the hands of ordinary people that are already “gatekept” (Reese & 
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Ballinger, 2001) by mainstream medias. However, on the other hand, this new technology 
of UT also provides opportunity for juxtaposing those ideologies and via “dialectical 
logic” (Merrill, 1989) reaching rational debate. Via a dialectical analysis of anti-Russian 
and anti-Georgian videos, this part of the thesis shows the web illustrations of the 
Russian and Georgian harsh antagonisms, and brings to light the partialness of both sides’ 
claims, representing their belligerent ideologies as small pieces of the Georgian and 
Russian war machines.   
 
The Need for War Machines’ Interruption 
In the situations where media plays an integral part in the war machines actions 
and seeks to submit newly emerging independent activists to reactive forces, activists 
may not find it sufficient to revolt in real life, but seek to protest via hacktivism.  
Deleuze (1995) introduces the need for “vacuoles of noncommunication, circuit 
breakers” (p. 175) as means of resisting the regimes of communication in control 
societies. “It’s true that, even before control societies are fully in place, forms of 
delinquency or resistance are also appearing. Computer piracy and viruses, for example, 
will replace strikes and what the nineteenth century called “sabotage” (“clogging” the 
machinery)” (Deleuze, 1995, p. 175). It could be proved that “vacuoles of 
noncommunication” have been realized already.  
The next subsections will scrutinize the exaggerated calls for an excessive 
securitization of cyberspace, calls that are partially based on speculations around the 
2008 cyber attacks on Georgia.  Through the application of the Schmitt Analysis, this 
paper will attempt to define whether Georgian computer network attacks fall under the 
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“cyber war” category, or are being reactively interpreted to lead to industrialized 
governments’ deeper entanglement into war machines.  That would lead to centralized 
control and militarization of cyber media, infringing on individual privacy rights and 
intensifing of war machines. 
 
Where's the "War" in the Russia-Georgia 
“Cyber War”? 
Recently, major cases of cyber attacks have emerged and added to the continuous 
drum beat of cyber threats, including cyber attacks on critical infrastructures and 
terrorists’ use of information and communication technologies (ICTs). As the attention 
towards cyber security grows, the cyber attack cases of Georgia have become one of the 
most frequently referred to piece of “evidence” for some scholars’ claims that “cyber 
space is in trouble” (Hollis, 2010, p. 2). 
This kind of intensification of cyber security discourse has even contributed to the 
formation of the official U.S. agenda that states: “cyberspace and its associated 
technologies offer unprecedented opportunities to the United States and are vital to our 
nation’s security and by extension, to all aspects of military operations” (Gates, 2009, p. 
1). The policy implications in the United States has also included the establishment of the 
Office of the National Cybersecurity Advisor, a so-called “cybersecurity czar” within the 
Executive Office of the President (Rockefeller, 2009), the creation of the military’s U.S. 
Cyber Command,  and the release of the draft National Strategy for Trusted Identities in 
Cyberspace  (Schmidt, 2010). Such international resonance of cyber attacks in Georgia, 
further strengthen the Georgian idea of being a victim in unjust cyber war. Therefore, 
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policy changes have also taken place in the country of Georgia, which made it easier for 
law enforcement to infringe individuals’ privacy online. On October 8, 2010, the 
Cybercrime Law was enacted and enforced in Georgia.  On the same day, Georgia joined 
the European Union Treaty on Cybercrime. One of the main reasons for developing these 
legislative changes rather quickly was the 2008 August cyber war in Georgia, when most 
of the governmental websites were hacked (Akhvlediani, 2009). 
In the summer of 2008, weeks before the Russian troops marched into full-scale 
conventional war against Georgia, cyber attacks began on Georgian websites. Based on 
Shadowserver Foundation comments, Danchev (2008) writes that the website of 
President Mikhail Saakashvili of Georgia (www.president.gov.ge) was unavailable for 
over 24 hours due to a “multi-pronged distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack” 
(para.2). Later on, Hollis and others labeled these cyber attacks a “dress rehearsal” for a 
Russian “cyber war” synchronized with conventional warfare, occuring less than a month 
before the physical assault began (Hollis, p. 4).  
The DDoS attacks against Georgian cyberspace reached an unprecedented level 
on August 8, the first day of Georgia’s armed conflict with Russia over its breakaway 
territory of South Ossetia. Most scholars believe the first detected coordinated online 
assault, conducted by six different botnets17 against the Georgian government and media 
websites, occurred at 2:00 PM GMT on August 8, 2008. Ahamad et al. (2008) concludes 
that on August 9, 2008, based on logs of DDoS traffic and changes in network routing, 
“Russian cyber warfare operations coincided almost exactly with the final ‘all clear’ for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 A botnet is a collection of compromised computers, each of which is known as a 'bot', connected to the 
Internet. When a computer is compromised by an attacker, there is often code within the malware that 
commands it to become part of a botnet. The "botmaster" or "bot herder" controls these compromised 
computers via standards-based network protocols (Puri, 2003). 
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Russian Air Force attacks sometime between 06:00 and 07:00 [a.m.]” (p. 4). Ashmore 
(2009) even claims that as the armed conflict escalated further, increased attacks on the 
Georgian ground mirrored the intensity of the attacks in Georgian cyberspace. 
But, there is a discrepancy among these various accounts on the number of 
attacked websites. According to the U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit report’s overview 
(Bumgarner et al., 2009), there were 17 Georgian websites targeted simultaneously; but 
Networked World (Oltsik, 2009) claims there were 54 websites, while Zoller (2010) 
wrote that it was hundreds of Georgian websites. However, the fact remains undeniable 
that nearly all the most important Georgian media, finance, business, and government 
websites were successfully attacked. “Banking, media and government websites were 
blocked, disrupting the flow of information throughout Georgia and to the outside world. 
The websites of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Bank were vandalized 
by adding pictures of the Georgian President and Adolf Hitler” (Ashmore, 2009, p. 10). 
The website StopGeorgia.ru was established in the summer of 2008 and provided 
volunteer hackers with the list of targeted websites in Georgia and instructions on how to 
carry out those attacks: “Any civilian, Russian-born or otherwise, aspiring to be a cyber 
warrior was able to visit pro-Russia websites to download the software and instructions 
necessary to launch denial-of-service attacks on Georgia. The only effort required by the 
user was to enter the Web address of a target and click a button labeled ‘Start Flood’” 
(McAfee, 2009, p. 6).  
According to Bumgarner et al. (2009), the first wave of cyber attacks was carried 
out by botnets and command and control systems, and started with only a few initial 
websites, the number of which was raised in the second wave of attacks. Some of the 
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website defacements were done through SQL injections,18 which were also discussed in 
the online attacker forums. 
To support the claim that cyber attacks against Georgia were part of Russian 
military operations, one of the arguments that various reports brought up was that attacks 
in cyber space were well-coordinated with Russian troops activities on the ground 
throughout the duration of the 2008 Russian-Georgian conflict (Ahamad et al., 2008; 
Goodman, 2010). However, Russia denied any involvement in the cyber attacks against 
Georgia. “Grey Goose,” a volunteer cyber analytical group, was set up to investigate the 
cyber attacks against Georgia, but no evidence was found to implicate the Russian 
government (Ashmore, 2009). 
Nationalistic accusations aside, the fact remains that, in total, researchers found 
traces of the following: route hijacking, brute force server compromise, data theft, multi-
factor DDoS attacking network and application layers, defacement, and the hosting of 
fake Georgian web pages containing misinformation and propaganda (Ahamad et al., 
2008, p. 3).  
In contrast to Estonia, which was similarly hacked in 2007, Georgia’s 
preparedness to minimize the negative affects of a cyber assault in 2008 was much lower, 
but “its international partners and private industry jumped to assist” (Goodman, 2010, p. 
61) in mitigating the offensive. As a result of Georgia’s plea for international support and 
assistance, Estonia, Lithuania, and Poland offered to host some Georgian government 
websites on their “better-defended systems” (Goodman, 2010, p. 61).   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 SQL (Structured Query Language ) injection is a code injection technique that exploits a security 
vulnerability in a website's software. 
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However, despite the high number of the defaced web pages and temporarily shut 
down cyberspace services, no permanent damage was done (Zoller, 2010). Nonetheless, a 
considerable number of scholars deem the 2008 cyber attacks on Georgia as an alarming 
“cyber war” precedent (Clarke, 2009; Hollis, 2009; Zoller, 2009), requiring further policy 
change and stronger securitization. As Clark and Levin (2009) assert, “the cybersecurity 
threat is real” (p. 7) and may cause catastrophic consequences for the United States if the 
U.S. continues to ignore cyber threats. “Adversaries can target networks, application 
software, operating systems, and even the ubiquitous silicon chips inside computers, 
which are the bedrock of the United States' public and private infrastructure” (Clarke, 
2009).  
 Swanson (2010) also believes that the 2008 cyber attacks on Georgia illustrate a 
potential manner by which to weaken an opposing state’s “critical infrastructures—
systems and assets vital to national security, economic security, and public health and 
safety” (p. 305). However, in the Georgian case of the cyber attacks, no critical 
infrastructures were targeted.  
 Some scholars suggest that the reason for this avoidance of critical infrastructure 
is because the attackers, who are believed to be Russians, might have deliberately chosen 
not to attack vulnerable infrastructures, to avoid higher levels of attention from the 
international community (Bumgarner et al., 2009; McAfee, 2009). According to the U.S. 
Cyber Consequences Unit’s report, “at least some of the Russian cyber attackers showed 
signs of considerable technical expertise. If the Russian military had chosen to get 
directly involved, such attacks would have been well within their capabilities. The fact 
that physically destructive cyber attacks were not carried out against Georgian critical 
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infrastructure industries suggests that someone on the Russian side was exercising 
considerable restraint” (Bumgarner et al., 2009, p. 5). 
 Nonetheless, based on the nonexistent evidence and hypothetical assumptions 
about the potential destructive capabilities of the Georgian cyber attacks, it seems an 
exaggeration to claim that these attacks illustrate how states will continue to use 
cyberspace to weaken an opposing state’s “critical infrastructures—systems and assets 
vital to national security, economic security, and public health and safety” (Swanson, 
2009, p. 305). In the publicly available overview of the U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit, 
there is no direct evidence to support the claim that the attackers were capable of 
implementing destructive cyber attack on the critical infrastructure of Georgia. Even if 
there were such evidence demonstrating the sufficient technical expertise of the attackers, 
still, the probability of political decision-makers allowing excessive damage and injury 
through the use of cyber attacks still seems rather remote.  
 Another type of argument in regards to equating the Georgian cyber-attacks case 
with an act of war is made by Zoller (2010). He argues that Russia “made cyberspace 
attack a major factor in its military strategy in order to coerce ‘near abroad’ nations to 
align with Russian national interests” (p. 1). Zoller (2010) builds off John Bumgarner (a 
former cyber security expert for the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies ) and 
Timothy L. Thomas (a senior analyst at the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas) in deeming that Russia’s cyber attacks triggered a “comparative 
inconvenience” and disorganization in the mind of average citizens, and thereby could be 
considered as a weapon of intimidation and coercion of “near abroad” states through the 
use of cyber assault. Based on this argument, Zoller (2010) calls the U.S. “to deter Russia 
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from using cyberspace to coerce its neighboring states” (p. 18). Zoller’s call is a kind of 
echo of existing voices in the current cyber security discourse. U.S. officials claim almost 
unanimously that the status quo in cybersecurity is no longer acceptable. “The United 
States must signal to the world that it is serious about addressing this challenge with 
strong leadership and vision” (White House, 2009, p. iii). Some even compare the “cyber 
war” era to “the atomic age” and refer to the potential scenario of a coordinated attack on 
a power grid, or on transportation or banking systems, which would create as much 
damage as a nuclear weapon (Harris, 2009, p. 6).  
  However, no damage done by the 2008 cyber attacks on Georgia could be 
comparable to the harm caused by the potential use of nuclear weapons. Goodman (2010) 
believes that despite Russia’s prevailing over Georgia’s cyberspace, at that time, 
“Georgia probably feared Russia’s physical attack more than its cyber attack” (Goodman, 
2010).   This statement, in my experience, is quite close to the reality. Because I had been 
in Georgia and interviewing people on the ground during the August 2008 war, I would 
say that in general, fears of cyber attacks, in comparison to the fears of physical invasion 
by the Russian army, were minor and almost inexistent in most parts of the country. 
Denning (2009) also agrees with the aforementioned statement and concludes that, “for 
Georgia, the Russian military’s invasion of its territory had a much greater impact” (p. 
10). So, could the cyber attacks on Georgian in 2008 alone be considered as an armed 
attack? I will return to this question when applying the Schmitt model to an analysis of 
the 2008 cyber attacks on Georgia. 
 Another argument that justifies labeling the 2008 cyber attacks in Georgia as a 
“cyber war” is the economic harm done by the cyber attacks. According to Hollis (2009), 
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“a cyber threat targeting the Internet’s very architecture could produce losses system-
wide” (p. 39) and result in trillions of dollars of losses. Hollis also writes that “attackers 
also disrupted Georgia’s financial system by having botnets launch DDoS attacks against 
international financial institutions that appeared to come from Georgia, triggering an 
automatic shutdown of Georgian banks’ access to international financial markets” (p. 15).  
 Along with that claim of financial disruption, some accounts still claim that “the 
cyber attacks on Georgia had ‘a strategic economic impact” (Goodman, 2009, p.115), 
which resulted in much stronger economic loss than the cyber-attacks-caused failure of 
online banking and other transactions had. The U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit’s report 
also builds towards the argument of cyber attacks causing strategic economic 
implications for Georgia. Bumgarner et al. (2009) believe that the cyber attacks 
augmented “unstable ground conditions” and “soon made Georgian pipelines seem 
unreliable” (p. 8), which resulted in the diversion of business from Georgian fuel 
pipelines over to Russian infrastructure at twice the price.  
 Nonetheless, a number of scholars compare Georgian cyber attacks to the 
Estonian cyber attacks in 2007, and admit that there is no noticeable economic damage 
caused by cyber attacks alone (Ashmore, 2009; Denninh, 2009). One of the explanations 
for cyberattacks being less severe for Georgia is that “Georgia is less dependent on 
cyberspace for banking and financial transactions, so the attacks would not have affected 
day-to-day business as much as in Estonia” (Denning, 2009, p. 10). Another rationale for 
classifying these cyberattacks as an act of war could be in the fact that the cyber attacks 
actually coincided with military operations during the conventional Russia-Georgia war. 
As Ashmore (2009) and some other scholars point out, “this was the first time that a 
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cyber attack was done in conjunction with armed conflict” (p. 10), but they fail to 
mention that because of this very fact, it is so hard to single out the role of “cyber 
attacks” in augmenting “unstable ground conditions” (Bumgarner et al. 2009, p. 8). 
 However, scholars like Beidleman (2009) still argue that “the economic impact of 
the Estonian and Georgian cyber attacks was considerable and illustrates the potential for 
future, more devastating attacks on economies” (p. 23). However, one might question 
how those cases could illustrate the potential for future devastating attacks on economies, 
if those attacks have not caused any high-level devastation that could be equated to an 
“armed attack.” 
 Among the circulating hypotheses justifying labeling the 2008 Georgian cyber 
attacks case as a “cyber war” is Georgia’s defeat on the PR battlefield as a result of these 
cyber attacks, perhaps the most highly acknowledged among scholars (Ashmore, 2009; 
Beidleman, 2009; Goodman, 2010; Hollis, 2011) writing on cyber security.  
 According to McAfee (2009), “Russia achieved a significant psychological 
victory by preventing Georgia from disseminating accurate information about the state of 
battle to the public. And, with Georgia’s side of the story silenced, Russia practically won 
the battle over international public opinion by default” (p. 6). As for Goodman (2010), 
cyber attacks “made it very difficult to offer the global media its [Georgia’s] perspective 
on the conflict” (p. 115), and “served to delay any international response” (Bumgarner et 
al., 2009, p. 5). Beidleman (2009) argues that defaced websites in Georgia limited 
Georgia’s ability to communicate its message not only to the world, but also to its own 
people. The U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit report’s overview states that “the inability of 
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Georgia to keep these websites up and running was instantly damaging to national 
morale” (Bumgarner et al., 2009, p. 5).  
 Deibert et al. (2010) named considerable “leverage gained in the conflict by the 
pursuit of information denial” (p. 30) as a second cyclone in cyberspace, and thereby 
emphasize the strategic importance of accessibility of online information, especially 
during the war, even if there was a low level of connectivity. Bumgarner et al. (2009) 
confirm that the cyber attacks were “intended to make Georgian population uncertain 
about what to expect and what they should do” (p. 6), i.e., they were intended to cause 
chaos among ordinary citizens. Consequently, as Hollis (2011) concludes, “Georgian 
difficulty in getting their media message out to the world, led to Georgia's strategic defeat 
in the war” (p. 1).  
 However, a cursory look at international media coverage of the 2008 August War 
in Georgia and only reviewing scholarly articles, it is not hard to notice dominance of 
pro-Georgian narratives over the pro-Russian narratives. If these cyber attacks really 
caused Georgia’s defeat in the battle over international public opinion, then how would 
one explain the significant international support for Georgia during the days of the war? 
According to Ashmore (2009): 
 Georgia received considerable assistance in countering the cyber attacks and in 
communicating internally and internationally. Google provided domain space to 
protect the websites of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Civil.ge, a Georgian 
Daily online news service. A private American Internet service provider (the head 
of the company is an ethnic Georgian) assisted the Georgian government by hosting 
the Georgian President’s website. The President of Poland also assisted the 
Georgian government by placing official press releases on his website. Estonia even 
sent two information security specialists from its Computer Emergency Response 




 As for the cause of chaos among ordinary citizens, it is impossible to single out 
the negative affects of cyber assault from those of conventional warfare. While I was in 
Georgia at that time, I observed that the population of the country, even in the capital of 
Georgia where citizens enjoy high levels of internet connectivity, was still heavily 
dependent on mainstream Georgian TV channels rather than online media. It could even 
be argued that the censorship of media by the Georgian government, as well as Georgian 
journalists’ self-censorship, motivated by national panic and fear not to give out any 
strategic military secret during the war, placed the Georgian population in an 
informational vacuum far more than cyber attacks.  
 It seems that the scholars labeling the 2008 Georgian case of cyber attacks  “cyber 
war” deemphasized factors that question their assumptions and use the Georgian case as 
evidence of future-hypothetical ICT-mediated-disasters. However, the major reason for 
such speculations about how the Georgian cyber-attacks presage all sorts of wild 
doomsday scenarios, perhaps, is due to the lack of a commonly endorsed model for 
scrutinizing the empirical data regarding cyber attacks. Therefore, application of the 
Schmitt model to the case of Georgian cyber attacks of 2008 will bring some systemized 
clarity and explanation to the current cyber security discourse. The next section will 
apply the Schmitt model to the case of the 2008 cyber attacks on Georgia, and will try 
determine whether these cyber attacks alone constituted an “armed attack,” and if they 
resulted in Georgia’s alleged defeat in the PR battle with Russia, caused internal chaos 
among the ordinary citizens of Georgia, and thus assisted in Russia’s successful invasion 




Application of Schmitt Analysis 
 In this subsection, I will lay out the Schmitt system (Schmitt, 1999), which enjoys 
considerable favor among scholars studying cyber security. Using this model will provide 
systematization for the consideration of the 2008 cyber attacks on Georgia.  
 As the Schmitt model speaks to the jus ad bellum aspects of a computer network 
attack (CNA), and builds off the United Nations Charter’s prohibition of the use of force 
in Article 2(4), this model allows us to attempt to determine whether the 2008 Georgian 
cyber attacks qualify as an act of war under International Humanitarian Law. 
 Since physical damage and human injury hypothetically could be achieved through 
the utilization of nontraditional military attack, i.e. cyber attacks, it is fair to consider 
CNA as an “armed attack,” even if there is no conventional weaponry used, nor 
implementation through kinetic energy. Thus, the 2008 Georgian cyber attacks, 
hypothetically, could be considered as an “armed attack”; however, for the cyber attacks 
to thus qualify, they would have to comply with a number of criteria provided by the 
Schmitt model. 
 I will start by examining the 2008 Georgian CNAs against relatively easily 
identifiable criteria of CNA that would go under “the armed attack” category. According 
to Schmitt, “the armed attack” would include a CNA that is “intended to directly cause 
physical damage to tangible property or injury or death to human beings” (p.913).  
Swanson (2010) also believes that the 2008 cyber attacks on Georgia illustrate a potential 
way to weaken an opposing state’s “critical infrastructures—systems and assets vital to 
national security, economic security, and public health and safety” (p. 305). However, in 
the Georgian case of the cyber attacks, no critical infrastructures were targeted 
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(Bumgarners et al., 2009). Therefore, it could be assumed that cyber attacks were not 
intended to cause any human death or injury or  physical damage of the country’s 
property. Thus, under this first criterion, the Georgian case of CNAs fails to earn “cyber 
war” status. 
 Another way of identifying the use of force is more complicated, as it neglects the 
absence of direct physical damage or injury criteria. Schmitt (1999) believes that the use 
of force in cyberspace could also be somewhere between economic coercion and the 
“armed attack,” and consequently offers a specific criteria for delimiting the “armed 
attack” force through economic and political coercion. I will go through all of the six 
criteria and analyze the nature of the consequences of the 2008 Georgian cyber attack. 
 1) Severity—when a CNA exhibits a much greater degree of threat of physical 
injury or destruction of property than in other forms of coercion. When compared to 
events like the massive deportation of Georgians from Russia in 2006, Russia’s 
tightening of Georgian visa regulations, and Russia’s imposition of an embargo on 
Georgia’s most highly exported products, namely wine and mineral water, the 2008 cyber 
attacks seem like flowers.  The aforementioned diversion of oil pipelines from a South 
Caucasian infrastructure to a Russian infrastructure was more the result of conventional 
warfare; there had been no cyber-attacks on the Georgian grid that controlled that 
pipeline.  Thus, these attacks do not meet the “severity” criteria. 
 2) Immediacy—a CNA’s immediacy is only analyzed in cases of great severity but 
without great severity, then the CNA does not qualify as an “armed attack”; the 




 3) Directness—a CNA is considered an act of war in cases of a more direct linkage 
of the armed coercion’s consequences to the actus reus, i.e., “wrongful deed.” Over the 
exact same time period when the cyber attacks occurred, the following type of actus reus 
took place: there occurred a heavy mass destruction in the area of Shida Kartli (bordering 
South Ossetia), and on a lighter level throughout the whole country; according to 
international organizations, 150,000 Georgian citizens became victims of the war with 
Russia, plus 326 died due to official Georgian statistics; 20,000 people had to flee from 
their houses; overall, the Georgian population, especially the area of Shida Kartli, 
suffered traumatic stress, loss of properties, economic and agricultural devastation, and 
consequently, the means of the local populace to earn a living. But how direct was the 
link between the cyber attacks and the above-stated severe consequences, especially if 
there was a full-scale conventional military operation going on in the country during that 
time period? One direct link would be if the conventional warriors were dependent on the 
cyber attacks as command signals, which was not the case. Another link would be if 
cyber attacks targeted critical infrastructure, which also did not take place. 
 4) Invasiveness—a CNA qualifies as an act of war if it causes an economic or 
political coercion representing a greater intrusion into the rights of the target state, 
featuring a greater potential for causing international instability. Defacement of a 
country’s main websites could probably be considered intrusion into the rights of the 
target state, but its potential use as an economic or political coercion is rather doubtful. 
Even Bumgarner et al., (2009), who advocates for the importance of the Georgia 2008 
“cyber campaign” and the urgent need for the creation of an international cyber response 
force, writes that political propaganda placed on hacked websites of Georgia “seems to 
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have been designed more for emotional disruption than political persuasion” (Bumgarner 
et al., 2009, p. 4). Bumgarner et al. (2009) do not even use the word “coercion”; that 
omission perhaps means that the cyber attacks alone, which were mostly intended to put 
up political propaganda or just deface websites, had almost zero effect on Georgia and 
therefore could not have caused any international instability. 
 5) Measurability, measures overall damage from the cyber attack, despite the 
inherent challenges in measuring the effects of cybernetic assault. If we put aside the 
conventional war factors and measure only the effects of the cyber attacks, those effects 
would not rank high, for no one died or was injured, and no significant property loss 
occurred (Zoller, 2010). Measuring the effects of low-level CNAs is problematic because 
they remain difficult to identify and measure due to their miniscule nature. Zoller (2010) 
also considers cyber attacks to be aimed at causing disorientation in the mind of ordinary 
citizens; thus, causing chaos would assure the success of military operations on the 
Georgian ground. However, as mentioned above, the Georgian population was heavily 
dependent on mainstream TV channels, the broadcasting of which were not affected by 
the cyber attacks, and the share of online media was tiny. Thus, disruption of online 
media could not have caused chaos. 
 6) Presumptive Legitimacy, considers the consequences of armed coercion 
presumptively impermissible. The consequences of the 2008 war in Georgia listed in the 
third criterion discussion above are impermissible, but they are not consequences of the 
2008 cyber attacks on Georgia. Destructive and damaging consequences of the 2008 
August War occurred as a result of armed battle that was going on during the 
conventional war involving armies of Georgia and Russia during that time. Therefore, the 
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2008 CNA in Georgia cannot be given the status of the “armed attack.” 
 While determining an “armed attack,” Schmitt (1999) also assesses “reasonably 
foreseeable consequences” (p. 916) according to the aforementioned criteria of CNA. So, 
I will now assess some of the consequences of the 2008 Georgian cyber attacks against 
this criteria scheme, beginning from July 2008, when the first attacks occurred, and how 
those  CNA could inform the potential cyber threats of the future. 
 1) Severity—when a much greater degree of threats of physical injury or 
destruction of property is occurring. The DDoS attacks on the Georgian president’s 
website on July 20th created a great inconvenience for the presidential administration and 
caused some disorientation among those who actively visit Mikheil Saakashavili’s 
website. However, threats of future physical injury or destruction of property in Georgia 
due to CNAs have not risen from that attack. 
 Some (Bumgarners et al., 2009; McAfee, 2009) claim that the attackers were 
capable of causing even more severe consequences through cyber attacks; if so, it would 
be fair enough to accept the future threat such as more severe attacks. According to the 
U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit’s report, “at least some of the Russian cyber attackers 
showed signs of considerable technical expertise and could implement physically 
destructive cyber attacks against Georgian critical infrastructure industries” (Bumgarner, 
et al., 2009). Nonetheless, the publicly available overview of the U.S. Cyber 
Consequences Unit does not present any direct evidence to support the claim that the 
attackers were capable of implementing destructive cyber attack on the critical 
infrastructure of Georgia. Thus, at this point, there could not be any foreseeable 
consequences that would comply with severity. 
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 2) Immediacy—if the aforementioned case is taking place with great immediacy. In 
the aforementioned case, the threat of physically destructive consequences did not exist, 
and, therefore, the factor of immediacy cannot be analyzed. 
 3) Directness—in the case of a more direct linkage of armed coercion’s 
consequences to the actus reus, i.e., “wrongful deed”; before the 2008 war in Georgia in 
July, it would probably have been less possible to anticipate if there would be any war, 
how long it would last, and what actus reus would take place as a result of the war. 
Therefore, identifying a direct linkage of the 2008 July cyber attacks with the 2008 
unanticipated August War seems less probable. 
 Those criteria do circumscribe the 2008 Georgian cyber attacks; there was neither 
“invasiveness” (4),  “measurability” (5), nor  “presumptive legitimacy.” That is, that the 
foreseeable consequences of future cyber attacks and the attacks of July 2008 in Georgia 
do not demonstrate high severity, immediacy, and directness on the cyber attacks with 
potential actus reus. Those CNAs could not have caused any international instability, nor 
be measured to demonstrate a strong use of force that is more than mere cases of 
economic or political coercion and that represents an armed coercion with presumptively 
impermissible consequences. According to Schmitt (1999), “an operation that generates 
doubt as to its status under use of force typology would surely not rise to the level of an 
armed attack” (p. 920).  Thus, by following the previous analysis of the 2008 Georgian 
cyber attacks case, referring to Georgian CNAs as an act of war is a mistake. 
 Nonetheless, based on the Schmitt Analysis (Schmitt, 1999), even if the Georgian 
cyber attacks did not constitute an armed attack, there still could be justification for a 
forceful response in self-defense against an attack. For the military defense against 
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allegedly Russian cyber attacks, according to Schmitt, a confluence of three factors must 
be present. I will now examine these factors in regards to the Georgian CNAs case: 
 1) The offensive CNA must be part of an overall operation, culminating in armed 
attack. This factor does not specify intensity and the nature of cyber attacks; therefore, 
this factor could be commensurable to the Georgia cyber attacks of 2008. 
 2) The CNA must be an irrevocable step in an imminent and probably unavoidable 
attack. The Russian military intervention could have occurred just as easily without the 
CNAs, therefore, the Georgian CNA cannot be considered either “irrevocable” or 
“unavoidable.” 
 3) The defender must be reacting in anticipation of the attack itself at the last 
possible opportunity available to effectively counter the attack (p. 933). This factor 
pushes us back to July 20th, 2008, when the cyber attack was implemented against the 
Georgian president’s website; there would have been no way for anyone at that time to 
anticipate that a war would follow these cyber attacks. However, even if it was possible 
to foresee the 2008 August cyber attacks on Georgia, it would be hard to contemplate 
them as an irrevocable step in conventional warfare, because these cyber attacks did not 
share the same consequences as a conventional war.  As Bumgarner et al. (2009) says, 
those attacks were intended to cause more emotional disruption than political coercion or 
physical damage. 
 That confluence of the three factors justifying military response to the cyber attacks 
is not present in the case of the 2008 Georgian cyber attacks. To return to an earlier point, 
Schmitt himself states that his model does not provide “new prescriptions” (p. 919); 
hence, his model may allow alternate angles of views on the same cases, including the 
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ones analyzed in this paper. However, the Georgian cyber attacks case, based on the 
Schmitt Analysis, does not seem to rise to the level of an “armed attack,” and therefore 
cannot be called a “cyber war.” Therefore, labeling the 2008 cyber attacks in Georgia as a 
case of “cyber war” only exaggerates security discourse unproductively. To go even 
further, if discussing cyber attacks on Georgia in 2008 in a different light, a completely 
different picture may be rendered, where nomadic actors are trying to interrupt colossal 
compositions of reactive forces.  
 
The 2008 Cyber Attacks on Georgia as  
a Sample Interruption 
 In fact, the rhizomatic networks of hacktivists, or cyber warriors as they call 
themselves, exemplify Deleuzian nomads; they are having virtually tactile relations with 
each other. Deleuze and Guattari describe this relation this way: 
The interlinkages do not imply an ambient space in which the multiplicity 
would be immersed and which would make distances invariant; rather, 
they are constituted according to ordered differences that give rise to 
intrinsic variations in the division of a single distance. (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1987, p. 493) 
 
Thus, I argue that nomads within their rhizomatic network are creating “vacuoles 
of noncommunication.” But before elaborating more on those, it is appropriate to unfold 
the concept of control societies, of enclosed environments that dominate the 
contemporary world. Those structures and enclosed institutions are factories, hospitals, 
and schools, which are becoming prison-like systems morphing into the bigger machines 
of control as their little moving parts. For Deleuze, “instant communication” plays a 
major role in feeding the control societies, keeping them in a constant state of modulation 
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(Marks as cited in Buchanan & Parr, 2006). The process of constant modulation19 that is 
taking place in the Caucasus explains the existence of the archetypes applied to public 
statements of government officials and news media. Thus, it is logical to agree with 
Deleuze and Guattari that subjectivity and collectivity are inseparable from the form of 
political communication that is characterized by resentment, and productions of faces of 
evil (Ivie, 2007) for making the intentions of governmental and other reactive forces 
appear noble. Therefore, Deleuze’s call, “we’ve got to hijack speech” (p. 175), seems fair 
enough: “The key thing is to create vacuoles of noncommunication, circuit breakers, so 
we can elude control” (Deleuze, 1995, p. 175). 
Deleuzian (1995) “vacuoles of noncommunication” (p. 175), the contemporary 
illustration of which includes cyber attacks aimed at disrupting war machine workflow, 
are at the same time part of another war machine. Despite its liberating potential, the 
World Wide Web is still well permeated by money and serves propagandistic goals. Not 
all web content is commodifying, but hardly anyone would agree that a President’s 
website is an objective and free source of information. Thus, if some choose to block the 
entrance of a television station and throw rotten vegetables and eggs against its windows, 
why would others not think of hacking a Presidential website, implementing denial of 
service attacks and replacing a President’s photos with some offensive images? 
 This kind of affirmation of the alternative view is painful for the Caucasian 
population, as it deterritorializes discourses, deprives country leaders of their illusory 
protector role, and disrupts the belief that only the other is evil and we are innocent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 In the Caucasian case modulation is not based on the model of business solely as described by Deleuze, 
but along with that model of getting better education and desired salary, it also includes reinforcement of 
certain borderlines in its citizens thinking. One of the best illustrations of this is the tendency to label 
different thinkers as traitors.  
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victims.  However, breaking away from modulation and embracing haecceity could open 
up new possibilities for the deadlocked conflicts, as those would draw abstract lines 
without contour, lines of “nomad art” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 507).  The 
forthcoming chapter will seek ways of stopping war machines via a creature of similarly 
nomadic nature, the rhizomatic (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987) network of new media.  
 







DEACTIVATING WAR MACHINES THROUGH  
DELEUZO-GUATTARIAN RHIZOME  
OF NEW MEDIA 
 
             This chapter is an intersection of Deleuzo-Gauttarian philosophy of 
multiplicities, Badiou’s ethics of truth, and, through the combination of those 
philosophies, advocates for new media activism against war machines (Deleuze, 1987).  
One-sidedness and bias are components of a bigger war machine represented by 
the South Caucasian media and, in particular, in Georgian media; they are revealed 
through the application of Badiou’s first and second principle obstacles for development 
of philosophy: the reign of merchandise and the reign of communication. Then the 
chapter introduces the idea of new media for disrupting war machine/s—an idea that 
employs the Deleuzo-Guattarian (1987) rhizome as its philosophical basis. The war 
machine is both immanent and implicit with respect to the practice of daily life. Rhizome 
does not have a beginning or an end, an identifiable structure, is in constant movement 
and process of becoming, could be cut, but will continue to develop from other points. 
Application of the rhizomatic, immanent approach via new media activism shows more 
productiveness in conflict resolution. Change may happen in war-divided societies, and 
what the role of both traditional and new media in this process could be, would be even 
more fruitful when discussed through the full spectrum of Badiou’s list of principal 
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obstacles for the infinite thought. Those are: “the reign of merchandise, the reign of 
communication,  the  need  for  technical  specialization  and  the  necessity  for  realistic  
calculation  of  security”  (Badiou,  2003, p. 42).    Application  of these principal 
obstacles for the infinite thought to Caucasian ontology helps classify the intensive 
multiplicity of dynamics.  
 After the Soviet Union broke up and a free market was introduced, the reign of 
governmental control of the media was replaced by the reign of merchandise.  
Newspapers started to self-censor to better and faster feed the needs of the war-
traumatized population with the Soviet mindset. Thus, the newspapers with stories about 
the glorious nation of Georgia, and their evil neighbor Russia, who helped Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia to break away, were and still are selling best in Georgia. People are happily 
paying to become quickly satisfied with this kind of information, and at the same time, 
are having their interest in new ideas killed. The editors of those newspapers do not want 
to stop working in support of the war machine, as this will deprive them and their co-
workers of their source of income.  Fortunately, noncommercial newspapers, supported 
by international organizations, try to bring in different points of views, but find it hard to 
compete with the “ infinite glitter of merchandise”  (Badiou, 2003, p. 40). For instance, a 
unique Georgian-Abkhazian newspaper, Panorama, which went through huge obstacles 
to put together the work of journalists from war-divided communities, by providing 
balanced information, was less popular and in some cases was even called a Russian 
propaganda tool for having information that was not well aligned with mainstream ideas. 
Thus, Badiou’s principle of the reign of merchandise is logically intertwined with the 
reign of communication. In other words, communication is thoroughly permeated by the 
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money, not only of big corporations, oligarchs, and governments, but also of the 
“masses.”  
 Thus, media-reproduced and modulated transcendent and self-righteous policies 
in Georgia and the rest of the South Caucasus already paved the way for further 
fracturing inside the region and are seeking emancipatory forces outside the region. 
Margarita Akhvlediani (2009) writes about how Armenian-Turkish relations started to 
warm up and how Azerbaijan started to become more aligned with Russia, perhaps 
because they saw that the West did not prove to be effective in stopping Russia swiftly 
from invading Georgia in 2008. Georgia itself, as usual, continues to rely on the West in 
hopes that one perfect day, NATO and EU structures will open their doors and help 
Georgia regain territorial integrity and overcome the Russian existential threat. However, 
as Badiou (2003) would say, there are no such great emancipatory forces that would play 
the role of a magic wand and solve all the problems. “We cannot hide behind any great 
collective configuration, any supposed force, any metaphysical totality which might take 
a position in one’s stead” (Badiou, 2003, p. 54). When applied to Caucasian ontology, 
this would read like an advocacy for grassroots media activism. And even though Badiou 
opposes the Deleuzo-Guattarian call for multiplicities and speed, he still makes a great 
contribution to the development of the Deleuzo-Guattarian idea of rhizome and new 
media via his immanent approach and call for perseverance.  
 So, could new media be an optimal way to reach a social change in such conflict-
swamped, locked, war-divided societies—and if yes, how? It would be helpful to go back 
to the ideas of Georgian contemporary philosopher Merab Mamardashvili, regarding his 
analog to the Deleuzo-Guattarian war machine, which is the mechanism discussed in the 
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previous section. According to Mamardashvili’s logic, the mechanism should be stopped 
by those who helped put it into motion. Similar logic could be found in Deleuzo-
Guattarian writing. “The war machine is the invention of the nomads (insofar as it is 
exterior to the State apparatus and distinct from the military institution)” (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1987, p. 380). Thus, if a war machine is of a nomadic nature, it could never be 
influenced by something as sedentary as government or mainstream media. So, the 
nomadic multiplicity of people that helped put the war machine into motion should not 
wait to be represented via some supposedly emancipatory forces, but speak up directly 
through creative media activism and thus challenge the militarist aspirations of the 
society.  For that, it is extremely useful to employ the idea of rhizome, proposed by 
Deleuze and Guattari, which has already been called “the philosophical bible of the 
cyber-evangelists” (Spiller, 2002, p. 96). Rhizome, indeed, is a perfect model for the 
World Wide Web, which would multiply the nomadic nature of citizen journalists’ 
activism.  
 
Blogosphere and Social Networks 
As Pool foresaw (1983), technology now provides a wide variety of delivery 
vehicles and forms of information display at low cost. To many, blogging deserves 
analysis; "bloggers have demonstrated themselves as technoactivists favoring not only 
democratic self-expression and networking, but also global media critique and 
journalistic sociopolitical intervention" (Kahn & Kellner, 2004, p. 91). For Tom O’reilly 
(2007), the blogosphere is "a kind of global brain" (p. 26) with the equivalent of 
"constant mental chatter in the forebrain." As with any human brain, this chatter also 
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could have various implications. There are two main views on the new media 
technologies, but this section will focus on the optimistic view, as it tries to promote 
rhizomatic media activism, which would contribute towards conflict resolutions in the 
Caucasus. The utopian/technophiliac approach could be easily recognized in the "Global 
Citizen Media Project’s" Manifesto: 
Thanks to new tools, speech need no longer be controlled by those who own the 
means of publishing and distribution, or by governments that would restrict 
thought and communication. Now, anyone can wield the power of the press. 
Everyone can tell their stories to the world. 
 
Optimists like Global Voices believe in a power of direct and decentralized 
communication, where participation and maximum information flow constitute the main 
components of a more democratic society (Mehra, Merkel, & Bishop, 2004; Rheingold, 
2002). With regard to ICT’s probability of reviving direct democracy, what Habermas 
(1989) calls “extension of fundamental rights in the social welfare state” could be the 
most relevant: 
The ideas of public sphere, preserved in social welfare state mass democracy, an 
idea which calls for rationalization of power through the medium of public 
discussion among private individuals, threatens to disintegrate with the structural 
transformation of the public sphere itself. (Habermas as cited in Durham & 
Kellner , 1989, p. 107) 
 
The blogosphere and social networks in terms of "a reflection of conscious 
thought and attention" have begun to have "a powerful effect" (O’reilly, 2007, p. 26) on 
development of civil society and challenging the political sphere. According to 
Technorati’s20 2010 report about the state of the blogosphere, 40% of respondents agree 
that their trust in mainstream media is dropping as a result of the emergence of new 




conditions contributing to new media and blogosphere success are that facts that: 1. blogs 
are relatively easy to create and maintain – even for nontechnical web users; 2. most of 
the blog platforms are free of charge; and 3. blogs represent the next evolution of web-
based experience. According to Richard Kahn and Douglas Kellner (2004), "blogs make 
the idea of a dynamic network of ongoing debate, dialogue and commentary central and 
so emphasize the interpretation and dissemination of alternative information to a 
heightened degree" (p. 91).  
 
Citizen Journalism 
      Self-told human stories of ordinary citizens created without professional 
journalistic intervention/mediation are perhaps the most effective way of opposing 
dehumanizing propaganda and thus helping to deactivate war machines. Those could be 
even more efficient than traditional journalistic reports as they have higher authenticity in 
depicting reality (Alan et al., 2009; Witt, 2009). One of the most significant advantages 
of citizen journalism is its eyewitness character and thereby immanent approach to 
reporting. As Barbie Zelizer (2007) contends, citizen journalists are able to better bring 
about the sense of “being there” which creates “…a broader thrust toward realism and a 
growing recognition of the value of direct observation” (p. 416). Needless to say, the 
technological development and increased accessibility of camera built-in cell-phones 
along with high quality amateur camcorders creates favorable conditions for citizen 
journalism development.  
 In the South Caucasus, there is not even a handful of organizations working with 
citizen journalists, but their work is starting to expand. One such organization is 
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Eyewitness Reporting Studio (www.gogroupmedia.net), which offers a platform for 
voices that are frequently marginalized in the mainstream media, such as those of 
minorities, women, and young people. Those individuals come from different layers of 
society and professional backgrounds, but through short documentary films and the 
World Wide Web, they tell human stories that indirectly foster sociopolitical intervention 
in the region. 
As Schuler (2008) says, what defines citizen journalism is “a networked structure of 
storytelling based on openness of information, horizontal linkage structures rather than 
vertical flows of information, blurring lines between content production and 
consumption, and diffused accountability based on reputation and meaning rather than on 
structural system hierarchies” (p. 381). Noticing the connection between citizen 
journalism and the Deleuzo-Guattarian rhizome is inevitable. The line of the rhizome 
does not form a contour like mainstream media, but instead it passes between points: 
It draws a plane that has no more dimensions than that which crosses it; therefore 
the multiplicity it constitutes is no longer subordinated to the One, but takes on a 
consistency of its own. These are multiplicities of masses or packs, not of classes; 
anomalous and nomadic multiplicities, not normal or legal ones; multiplicities of 
becoming, or transformational multiplicities, not countable elements and ordered 
relations; fuzzy, not exact aggregates, etc. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 505) 
 
Those nomadic multiplicities of masses Deleuze and Guattari (1987) refer to are teams of 
resident reporters from amongst the general public, including some professional 
journalists, who produce a series of short films, blogs, multimedia outputs documenting 
real-life stories about human rights, the rule of law, economic development, and the 
peaceful resolution of conflicts. These currently acting citizen journalists are still only 
drops of water in an ocean, but they are aimed at decreasing people’s self-righteous and 
self-centric attitudes that are strengthened through one-sided media coverage. 
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Collaboration between War-divided TV, 
Radio, and Print Journalists 
It also should be noted that regardless of a significant resonance upon its 
emergence and popularization, new media cannot be a replacement for other forms of 
interaction and communication, only a powerful supplement (Danitz, & Strobel, 2002).  
According to early researches, media is capable of both fomenting (Doob, 1935; 
Lasswell, 1928) and reducing prejudice and conflict (Cooper & Jahoda, 1947; 
Flowerman, 1949; Peterson & Thurstone, 1933). Unfortunately, the media’s role in the 
reconciliation of ethnic conflicts has not yet been sufficiently realized.  
In terms of developing rhizomatic antiwar machine mechanisms, it would be 
rather effective to create long-term projects involving leading Georgian, Russian, 
Abkhazian, and South Ossetian TV journalists working together on joint footage that 
should be broadcasted widely by the national TV channels. At the first stage, such joint 
journalistic work should bypass statements of officials and only focus on human-interest 
stories of victims and solders from all sides of the conflict; then documentaries should be 
produced reflecting all sides’ national discourses. Special talk-shows with the discussions 
about those documentaries should be arranged, where the clash of war-divided 
communities ideologies will be shown; finally, all the materials should be uploaded on 
YouTube and on any other international free video sharing websites, where commentary 
debates involving the belligerent and nationalistic online activists could be stimulated. 
Such multisided media spectacles would enable the audience to overcome stereotypical, 
prejudicial, one-sided thinking that foments no-war-no-peace situations and stands in the 
way of reconciliation. 
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Transformative Mediation through 
Media Production 
It would be more useful to discuss the application of Deleuzo-Gauttarian 
principles of rhizome to new media activism and the potential for those serving as 
catalysts of the conflicts towards the “four dimensions of reconciliation” (Ramsbotham et 
al., 2005, p. 232). Principles of connection and heterogeneity would enable the exchange 
of diverse points of views, which would gradually result in the acceptance of the status 
quo by the conflicting parties. That would mean that Azerbaijanians would accept 
Nagorno-Karabakh being broken away from their nation state; Armenians would have to 
admit that Azerbaijanians have the right to claim Nagorno-Karabakh, despite the fact that 
there is currently no Azerbijanian control over that region—it is their territory according 
to international borders; Georgians would have to accept that Abkhazians and South 
Ossetians do not recognize Georgian legitimacy on their territory; Abkhazians and South 
Ossetians would realize that international actors still consider Georgia as the official 
owner of the territory from which they are claiming to be independent. Such acceptance 
of the status quo would only be possible with the contribution of the creative, 
provocative, interactive media activism of citizens living in conflict zones and rural areas, 
which would be placed in the nomadic, rhizomatic cybersphere. This kind of media 
activism would look like citizen journalism accounts in the form of documentary films, 
photography, animation shorts, blogs, multimedia projects or any other kind of visual 
and/or verbal productions. The difference between those citizen journalists’ pieces and 
mainstream media accounts will be the multiplication of alternative thoughts and 
viewpoints that is so underrepresented at this time.  
96 
 
 The principle of multiplicity of the Deleuzo-Guattarian rhizome, i.e., new media, 
will help “expose arborescent pseudomultiplicities for what they are” (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1987, p. 8) and thus will question the objectivity and fairness of mainstream 
media coverage. Those multiple lines of new media networks would help find connecting 
threads for the conflicting accounts of war-divided communities and thus realize the 
second dimension of reconciliation—“correlation of accounts” (Ramsbotham et al., 2005, 
p. 232)—through blogging, commenting, sharing, tweeting, channeling, and foruming. In 
the Caucasus, a correlation of accounts, even between states such as Georgia and 
Armenia that do not have an official shared conflict zone, remains rather complex. 
Needless to say, the scale of complexity in correlating accounts related to the state 
borders would be much higher between the other state and nonstate actors in the region, 
which do have official conflict zones. Therefore, from the point of view of current 
fractionation and self-centricity, bridging opposites seems rather problematic. It would be 
logical here to agree with Deleuze and Guattari on the fourth principle of the rhizome, 
regarding signifying rupture: “there is a rupture in the rhizome whenever segmentary 
lines explode into a line of flight, but the line of flight is part of the rhizome. These lines 
always tie back to one another” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 9). Because of its openness 
to new ideas, sedentary, reactive forces might attempt to break the lines of connection 
between conflicting accounts, but a rhizome “will start up again on one of its old lines, or 
on new lines” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 9). The independence and nomadic nature 
of the lines of the rhizome are also due to the principles of cartography and 
decalcomania. These make new media activism “not amenable to any structural or 
generative model” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 12). Following the principles of 
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rhizome, there would be all the conditions for the realization of the third and fourth 
dimensions of reconciliation, which are “bridging opposites” and “celebrating 
differences” (Ramsbotham et al., 2005, p. 232). 
  Civil society should prove its strength by recognizing patterns of nationalistic, 
prejudicial, and destructive ideology being exerted at various levels—official political 
statements, print, or electronic media. A population has to be informed to be able to think 
critically and responsibly. Like Rheingold says: “The technology will not in itself fulfill 
that potential; this latent technical power must be used intelligently and deliberately by 
informed population…” (Rheingold, 2000, p. xix). 
  This kind of affirmation of the alternative view is painful for the Caucasian 
population, as it deterritorializes discourses, deprives country leaders of their illusory 
protector role, disrupts the belief that only the other is evil and we are innocent victims.  
However, breaking away from modulation and embracing haecceity could open up new 
possibilities for the deadlocked conflicts, as those would draw abstract lines without 
contour, lines of “nomad art” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 507).   
Thus, belligerent one-sidedness of the war machine’s media could be challenged 
by new media activism. Innovative, nomadic artful media activism can expose pseudo-
multiplicity of the reactive forces, interrupt transcendent circulations, help develop civil 
societies, and reconcile divided communities. 
 
 
  	  
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
 	  	  	  
This paper has given an account of and the reasons for the widespread one-
sidedness of the South Caucasus and its destructive character as illustrated by the 
Deleuzo-Guattarian war machine. As Deleuze and Guattari point out, the importance of 
the war machine and their philosophy in general is “…to draw attention to collective 
mechanisms of inhibition. These mechanisms may be subtle, and function as 
micromechanisms” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 385). This paper provided and 
analyzed examples of such micromechanisms of the bigger war machines, such as 
journalists and media producers exercising reactive media coverage, civil societies 
generating new myths justifying the informational vacuum in which they are being held 
by one-sided media coverage, and decision-makers tied by the pseudo-obligations of 
fulfilling promises made to the electorates based on their mythical perceptions regarding 
the ethnic and territorial conflicts. These groups, who represent different layers of 
societies in the Caucasus, can be seen as the bands or pack phenomena signifying war 
machines that Deleuze and Gattari (1987) refer to. 
 
This essay has argued that media activism is the best instrument to challenge and 
possibly deactivate war machines, as its rhizomatic and nomadic character
 
is best suited 
for tackling war machines with similar nomadic natures. This thesis explained the highly 




The goal of utilizing Cultural Affirmative Philosophy was to reveal unpopular, 
perhaps hidden, perspectives on conflict resolution. This study set out to define the ways 
that war machines operate, and through exposing these obstacles of conflict resolution, 
uncovered the perspectives. This paper tried to define how the transformation of deadlock 
situations could be attained through media activism. The present study was firstly 
designed to determine the effects of war machines and their possible treatment through 
media activism.  
Returning to the hypothesis posed at the beginning of this study, it is now possible 
to state that Cultural Affirmative Philosophy helps to analyze and find solutions for the 
problems in the South Caucasian Conflicts. However, this Deleuzo-Guattarian, 
Nietzschean, and Badiouan approach does not provide ready prescriptions for curing the 
war machines malady, nor does it guarantee success of potential ways of treatments. 
 
Research Question One: What Perspectives Does the Cultural 
Affirmative Philosophy Open Up for 
the South Caucasian Conflicts? 
This study has shown that the most prominent advantage of the Cultural 
Affirmative Philosophy of Deleuze, Guattari, Nietzsche, and Badiou is the call for 
realization of immanence, appreciation of processes of multiple becomings, which 
altogether form a strong argument that things can always be otherwise. The focal point 
(and at the same time innovation) of such a grasp on versatility of even deadlocked 
circumstances such as South Caucasian conflicts proves that it is not based on 
transcendental visions or perceptions of reality through dreamy, mythical “would be” 
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lenses. The potential of Cultural Affirmative Philosophy, rather, is in its ontological 
approach, which is oriented on flexible treatment of issues as they change.  
 The importance of emphasizing distinction between the immanent and 
transcendental course lays in the problem of the South Caucasian conflicts as discussed in 
the first chapters of this thesis. Caucasian perceptions and policies are and have been 
essentially aimed at rationalizing conflicts and making conflicts static and one-sided. 
Thus, as illustrated in the war of videos between Georgia and Russia on YouTube, 
articulation of one’s own position yielded disarticulation of its counterpart’s beliefs. Such 
destructive essences represent transcendental visions of a better future in the Caucasus, 
which is lacking the other sides of the conflicts. Georgia’s hope of regaining its territorial 
integrity once it is accepted into the NATO could be one of the examples of such 
transcendental thinking.  
Therefore, radically different pictures are rendered when Caucasian conflicts are 
exposed to the Cultural Affirmative Philosophy. Its rhizome “…pertains to a map that 
must be produced, constructed, a map that is always detachable, connectable, reversible, 
modifiable, and has multiple entryways and exits and its own lines of flight,” (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1987, p. 21).  
Such surrender to nomadic infinite thought could well help Caucasians let go of 
their past grievances, focus on the present, and gain an immanent approach: 
A response to inequity and infringement designed for a singular set of 
circumstances promises to be better fitted to immanent political, economic, 
cultural, religious, and aesthetic conditions than does a response consisting in the 
discursive invocation of and reliance on abstracted categories of transcendent sets 
of universal principles. (Hawes, 2010, p. 263)   
 
With such an immanent approach, Caucasians would ultimately switch their focus 
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from narrow territorial claims to broader region-wide ambitions, which could also 
involve the fulfillment of their initial claims related to territorial integrity and the survival 
of ethnic identities.  
Even though Badiou’s ideas operate in tandem with the Deleluzo-Guattarian 
manifest for immanence, he claims to be against multiplicity in forms of polyvalence, and 
says that “…thought must at least be able to extract itself from this circulation and take 
possession of itself once again as something other than an object of circulation” (Badiou, 
2003, p. 49). However, if there were no circulation, there would be nothing to extract.  
Nonetheless, Badiou generates similar contemplations favoring the idea of needed 
interruption.  “If philosophy is to sustain its desire in such a world [the world of endless 
circulation], it must propose a principle of interruption” (Badiou, 2003, p. 48-49). One 
type of interruption would be a “cyber attack,” or hacktivism, as discussed in the previous 
chapter. However, new media, or creative activism, would be more peaceful and 
constructive. This is related to Deleuze’s (1995) advocacy for the “vacuoles of 
noncommunication” (p. 175) as means of resisting the regimes of communication in 
“control societies.” Both types of interruptions are aimed at disrupting the reign of 
oppresive communication. However, provocative new media activism could be the best 








Research Questions Two and Three: What Are the Implications 
for Media Activists in the Process of Opening New 
Perspectives  Through Their Activism? 
What Are the Social and Political 
Implications of Rhizomatic 
Media Activism in the 
South Caucasus? 
As already mentioned in the previous chapter, there are two main views on the 
new media technologies. However, this section will flesh out the pessimistic view- the 
dystopian/technophobic view as the potential threats to  rhizomatic media activism.   
It should be noted that there should be fantasies regarding the universality of the 
new media as catalyst. As Doug Schuler (2003) says, there is nothing inherently 
democratic about technology. The earlier provided analysis of anti-Georgian and anti-
Russian YouTube videos shows that technology is being used to spread propaganda and 
reproduce dominant ideology, which makes it a mere tool in the hands of ordinary people 
who are already “gatekept” (Reese & Ballinger, 2001) by mainstream medias.  
Thus, the pessimistic perspective focuses on how the goodness of the “public sphere” 
(Habermas, 1989) could not be realized because of neoliberal capitalist domination 
(Brown, 1997; McChesney, 2002; Wilhelm, 2000). Under this analysis, it is hegemony, 
and not democracy, which dominates the Internet, which is increasingly fortified by 
multinational corporations and nation-state actors (Hindman, 2008).  
Those multinational corporations and nation-states in multiple cases spread 
conformist and reactive—rather,  than active—pathos, thereby decreasing the 
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transformative potential of rhizomatic media activism. Deleuze and Guattari 
acknowledge the existence of “micro black holes” [potentially weak or reactive new 
media actors] and the lines of flight that, “…always risk abandoning their creative 
potentialities and turning into a line of death, being turned into a line of destruction pure 
and simple (fascism)” (Deleuze & Guattari, p. 506). 
The fact that the state controls cyberspace in some Asian and post-Soviet 
countries has analogies in the West, and confirms the substantiality of Deleuzo-
Guattarian fears about the potential downfall or risk of nomadic media activists. Deibert 
et al., (2010) are concerned about peoples “…implicit (and perhaps unwitting) consent to 
the greatest invasion of personal privacy in history," which is taking place even in 
democratic countries where "…surveillance systems penetrate every aspect of life."  
A more concrete explanation is Badiou’s idea of why there is no easy way for the 
realization of infinite thought. Returning to the discussion of Badiou’s obstacles for 
infinite thought is timely. The last two obstacles, as he puts them, are the needs for 
technical specialization and calculation of security. The need for technical specialization 
not only breaks the circuit of rhizome’s universality by subjugating its lines to one or the 
other category, but also pulls the brightest minds into the arborescent fields of technical 
specializations, leaving the rhizomatic humanities insufficiently realized.  On the other 
hand, the obsession with calculating security is already infringing on online privacy and 
militarizing some parts of the Internet.  
Thus, the ICTs’ platform cannot fully promote individuals’ autonomous 
participation in development of civil society, but rather merely upholds commodification, 
commercialization, and state ideologization. Some reasons for pessimistic views could be 
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justified by Georgia, where like in other countries, business and political parties 
organizations are actively blogging and communicating with potential consumers via 
social networks, thus narrowing space for public deliberation. The lack of quantitative 
analysis on this regard hinders further  arguments, though this tendency towards 
decreasing “breathing room for civil society” (Morozov, 2009) by commercial 
comodification and political ideologies is more than noticeable. 
Commercial and political holding of the Internet is supported by the fact that not 
all layers of societies are represented equally in the blogosphere and social networks. As 
Roger Hurwitz points out (1999), "the Internet’s diffusion has increased the opportunities 
for political action among those who are already the most politically active and 
informed." To be properly informed and not gate-kept by mainstream media, people need 
to have Internet access and free time for thinking. According to the Central Intelligence 
Agency, only 1.024 million out of 4.4 million have Internet access in Georgia; this 
population mostly constitutes the middle class, which does not suffer that much from 
economic hardships or ethno-territorial conflicts. Therefore, the potential for discussing 
antigovernmental and antimainstream ideas in cyberspace is not as expansive as it could 
be in the case of citizens receiving equal access to Internet throughout the country and 
region.  
Moreover, it should be noted as well that it is not easy to be critical of 
government or the mainstream ideas in the South Caucasus and in Georgia in particular. 
As Andrey Babitsky (2010) argues on Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty Ekho Kavkaza 
section, “anyone who risks to say something critical of the president of Georgia or his 
entourage, immediately is placed in the less favorable club of the Putin or totalitarian 
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Russia supporters.”  
?  According to one of the most popular bloggers in Georgia, Dodie Kharkheli, 
"Internet - Society" in general is much more loyal to the government, because those who 
have access to the Internet are mostly satisfied with their state of being and current 
leadership of the country. As she has observed during last years, despite the presence of 
some sharp oppositional users online, the ratio of pro-versus antigovernmental users 
online would be only about 35/65.  Although it appears new media, unwittingly, has 
become just another tool of the state, the recent Georgia-Russo War has demonstrated the 
inverse. 
 Thus, the above-stated confirms that earlier advocated potential of media activism 
should not be romanticized or taken for granted. Its potential should rather be realized 
through constant assessment of risks, possible downfalls and, in general, the process-
essence of the whole becoming- process.     
 
Implications for Future Research 
The possible negative implications of media activism identified in the previous 
section along with its positive potentials discussed in Chapter III assist in an 
understanding of the role of media in conflict resolution. This research will serve as a 
base for future studies and NGO-facilitated media empowerment in the places where 
independent voices are needed most.  
 The current findings add substantially to an understanding of underlying causes of 
deadlock conflicts in the South Caucasus and potential ways out. The current findings 
add to a growing body of literature on Cultural Affirmative Philosophy and the role of 
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media in conflict resolution through its transformative mediation. The findings in this 
study provide a new insight into the reconciliatory potential of irrational and illogical 
South Caucasian conflicts without trying to centralize its problems around right- or 
wrong-doers.  The findings from this study make several contributions to the current 
literature. First, it adds to the scholarly works on history, politics, sociology, and 
ethnography of Caucasian conflicts. The study ties existing literature to the Cultural 
Affirmative Philosophy and uses the scholarly and media works on Caucasus to illustrate 
war machines and potential development of their antidote that is the rhizome of media 
activism. The present study provides additional evidence with respect to the growing role 
of media production as the instrumental process of reaching “fusion of horizons” 
(Gadamerian concept as cited in Ramsbotham et al., 2005, p. 293). This study confirms 
previous findings and contributes additional evidence that suggests that change is 
attainable through the empowerment of local actors. In other words, it confirms the 
importance of the immanent approach and argues that media activism could be the best 
way for the approach’s realization. Whilst this study did not confirm that here have been 
significant changes already reached through media activism, it did partially substantiate 
the needs and transformative potential of the provocative, constructive, and creative 
media production. 
Finally, a number of important limitations need to be considered. First, the study 
was mainly aimed at defining problems through the application of Cultural Affirmative 
Philosophy and Deleuzo-Guattarian war machines in particular. The definition and 
discussion of solutions was the secondary goal as it was primarily based on the 
explanation of local problems, rather than their solutions. The current investigation was 
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limited by the lack of accessibility of literature published only in indigenous languages. It 
also should be indicated that the study did not focus equally on all three ethnic and 
territorial conflicts of the Caucasus, but rather provided a picture of the region based on 
examples related mainly to Georgia. One reason for that is my extensive experience 
regarding Georgian conflicts, another being the linguistic limitations of materials in local 
languages (Armenian and Azeri). However, the decision not to leave out the Armenian-
Azeri conflict was made intentionally as it shares the majority of characteristics with 
Georgian conflicts and helps realize an immanent and holistic regional approach. Without 
analyzing the Armenian-Azeri conflict, it would be hard to activate the media rhizome.   
The current research was not specifically designed to make a detailed evaluation 
of factors related to the transformation of the media producer and its audiences, but tried 
to lay the foundation for future research focusing on specifics related to media 
production. The issues that were not addressed in this study are the potential topics for 
media production, time frame, method of media dissemination, and discussion. 
 This research has brought out many questions in need of further investigation. 
Further work needs to be done to describe the process that transforms perceptions of the 
media producer and its audience as a result of media production. Ideally, further research 
should be undertaken on the following stages of media production: 1. Subject/topic 
research; 2. Storyboarding; 3. Material gathering; 4. Editing; 5. Fine-tuning; 6. 
Dissemination and discussion. Further experimental investigations are needed to estimate 
how radically a media producer’s perception on a prejudiced issue can change. On what 
stage(s) does the change occur? Does the similar transformation of viewpoints happen 
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amongst the audience? At what stage? How can online discussion further foster 
dissemination of alternative ideas?  
What is needed now is a cross-Caucasian study involving citizen journalists and 
traditional media producers and their audiences who are at the same time in the process 
of becoming content producers. More broadly, research is also needed to determine 
potential strategies better realizing rhizomatic networks of media production and 
avoiding aforementioned downfalls of media activism. Further research regarding the 
role of constructive, creative media activism would be of great help to developing NGO 
work in this field and empowering media activists for reaching social change, which 
would deactivate war machines. If the debate is to be moved forward, a better 
understanding of the opportunities, needs and possible risks has to be developed. This 
information can be used to develop targeted interventions aimed at decreasing one-
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